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The violent and diffuse nature of the Iraqi insurgency has become a major 
obstacle to reconstruction and the withdrawal of coalition military forces.  The central 
problem with the coalition’s counterinsurgency strategy is that it fails to take into account 
the diverse goals and historical motivations of the groups involved.  A coalition 
counterinsurgency strategy flexible enough to deal with Iraq’s insurgent groups 
differently as opposed to monolithically will be more effective in achieving long term 
stability in Iraq.   
This thesis argues that the Iraqi insurgency can be disaggregated into categories 
that will better assist policy makers in identifying and understanding insurgent groups.  
Sunni, Shi’ite, and transnational categories are used to divide insurgents, showing each to 
have specific traits.  Categories of insurgents are further divided, where insurgent groups 
are examined in more detail.  Based on the disaggregation, recommendations for 
counterinsurgency strategy orientations are proposed.   
America’s long-term legacy in the Middle East will depend on the conditions of 
our departure from Iraq.  It is only through a more thorough understanding of Iraq’s 
insurgent groups and the proper application of a counterinsurgency strategy which 
accounts for the differences between groups that America will be able to make this legacy 
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I. OVERVIEW AND THE CURRENT STATE OF IRAQ’S 
INSURGENCY 
With the fall of the Iraq’s Ba’athist regime in April of 2003, came the rise of a 
complex insurgency and America’s most significant military challenge since the Vietnam 
War.  Since that time, coalition forces in Iraq have been faced with an ongoing and 
progressively more organized insurgency which has claimed over 1,300 American lives, 
over four times as many civilian lives, and has had an incalculable cost in economic loss, 
infrastructural damage, and military spending.  On a daily basis, coalition forces are 
harassed by armed attacks, mortar fire, and improvised explosive devices (IED)s which 
have resulted in virtually constant casualties.  Considering America’s lack of accurate, 
tactical, human intelligence (HUMINT) in Iraq, coalition forces have been fighting an 
increasingly uphill battle against a multitude of well armed and determined insurgent 
groups.  America’s only apparent solution seems to be the expedited training of the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF), who have shown themselves to be relatively unreliable and 
thoroughly infiltrated by insurgents and collaborators.1  Currently, as Iraq’s fledgling 
government attempts to frame a new constitution, coalition and ISF continue to make 
little headway against this diverse and seemingly endless insurgency. 
A wide variety of ethnic, sectarian, political, and economic motivations underpin 
the diverse insurgency in Iraq.  It is my contention that one of the greatest policy errors in 
America’s formulation of a counterinsurgency strategy was a failure to take into account 
this multitude of differences, and recognize many of the clear divisions between 
insurgent groups.   It is in this respect that I address the question of: What typological 
breakdown of the Iraqi insurgency will best account for group differences and assist in 
the formulation of a more flexible and effective counterinsurgency strategy?   
Chapter I of this thesis discusses the general nature of the Iraqi insurgency and 
introduces the specific typologies that I use to break down the Iraqi insurgency into 
categories.  This is followed by an explanation of why it is necessary to disaggregate 
                                                 
1  Col Jerry Durrant USMC, director 1stMarDiv Iraqi Security Forces training activities al-Anbar 




Iraq’s insurgent groups and the overall significance of this to U.S. policy in Iraq.  
Chapters II-IV examine each insurgent category and the subdivisions within the 
categories.  This thesis concludes in chapter V with a set of brief policy oriented 
recommendations based on more detailed insight into Iraq’s different insurgent groups. 
 
A. THE GENERAL NATURE OF INSURGENCY AND SPECIFIC 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE   
The Central Intelligence Agency defines insurgency as: 
 A protracted political-military activity directed toward completely 
or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of 
irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent 
activity—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, 
for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, 
and international activity—is designed to weaken government control and 
legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The 
common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a 
particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely 
terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an 
alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country.2  
While the bulk of this characterization holds true with regard to the resistance in 
Iraq, the last sentence in this definition is problematic.  Currently, there are clearly groups 
within Iraq fighting the coalition that do not have long-term plans for an alternative 
government. While many of these groups may be transnational, others may simply be 
locally-centered Sunni groups with only immediate goals and a limited vision for the 
future of Iraq.  Regardless, all of Iraq’s resistance groups are currently being labeled and 
perceived as part of Iraq’s greater “insurgency problem”.  Due to this, I initially classify 
all of Iraq’s anti-coalition resistance movements as insurgent groups for the purpose of 
my thesis, allowing for the “re-labeling” of the specific typological subdivisions once a 
more clear understanding of the players involved is established.     
When considering the nature of the Iraqi resistance, the only two significant 
characteristics that insurgent groups share are fairly intuitive.  All of Iraq’s insurgent 
groups maintain an interest in expelling coalition forces, which are currently the only 
                                                 
2  Central Intelligence Agency, “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” (Washington D.C.:  U.S. 
Government Printing Office, no date), 2.   
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major hurdles between the insurgents and their goals of power, wealth, prestige, or 
ideological victory.   In addition, all of Iraq’s insurgent groups have taken advantage of 
Iraq’s cities, using them as refuges, making the insurgency a largely urban phenomenon.  
Based on the lack of cover provided by most of Iraq’s geography and the proficiency of 
American military units and technology in this environment, the decision by insurgents to 
utilize the urban environment makes sense.  Beyond these two factors, Iraq’s different 
religious, national, tribal, and ideologically motivated groups give the insurgency a 
diverse flavor. 
 
B. DISAGGREGATION OF THE IRAQI INSURGENCY INTO 
TYPOLOGIES 
Because of the social and historical demographics of Iraq, I argue that it is 
necessary to understand the Iraqi insurgency as a variety of different concurrent 
movements as opposed to one monolithic phenomenon.  I demonstrate this multiple 
nature of the Iraqi insurgency by examining three different social groups, their 
movements, and opposition activities.  Given the strong sectarian affiliations within 
Iraq’s population, religion is probably the single biggest divider among insurgent groups.  
Beyond this, we must look to group motivation in order to further disaggregate the 
insurgency.  The Shi’ites, Sunnis, and transnationals are all characterized by differing 
social bases, motivations, and organizing strategies.   Each of these three groups in turn 
holds numerous tendencies within. The breakdowns are aimed at not only giving a 
typological structure to the Iraqi insurgency, but at flushing out subdivisions within each 
category.  In this respect, the categories of insurgents outlined in this thesis are intended 
to be functional, assigning specific attributes to each category and sub category of 
insurgents which will better assist U.S. policymakers in identifying the strengths, 
weaknesses, and divisions between insurgent groups.   
1. The Shi’ites 
Congregated in southern Iraq and a numerically majority to the Sunnis, the 
Shi’ites have been a historically repressed population.  Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
underground political networks oriented toward communism and Islamic government that 
were subdued under the Ba’athists have once again begun to come into the public sector.  
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This, combined with the relationship between the Shi’ite ulama and its community, has 
established a unique base for a Shi’ite insurgency in Iraq.  While the Mahdi Army has 
proven to be the Shi’ites only mainstream insurgent group, it was not widely embraced 
by Iraq’s Shi’ite community.  This chapter will examine the Mahdi Army, its origins, 
goals, ideological basis, and show it to be representative of only a small portion of the 
extremely diverse views found within Iraq’s Shi’ite community. 
2. The Sunnis 
Concentrated in central Iraq, the Sunnis have been a ruling minority over Iraq’s 
Shi’ites for centuries, reaping the social, political, and economic rewards of their 
positions.  The spring of 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government brought 
an end to this system and largely disenfranchised many of Iraq’s traditional power 
structures.  Many of these power structures had been revitalized by Saddam Hussein in 
the past few decades in an attempt by the former dictator to consolidate his power within 
Iraq.  These traditional power structures take the shape of tribes in Iraq, and their 
significance, as well as their past relations with Saddam Hussein’s regime are possibly 
the most misunderstood aspects of history with regard to the coalition’s current policy in 
Iraq.  For the purpose of this thesis, a tribe is defined as a collection of “affiliated clans 
(who) claim to have a common lineage or descent.”3  The clans that make up a tribe are 
further divided into sub-clans, which are eventually made up of extended family 
groupings, and finally single families.   
The legacy of this reversal of fortune for the Sunnis has been the rise of a multi-
faceted Sunni insurgency, which can be generally divided into Sunni tribal insurgent 
groups, Sunni former régime loyalists (FRLs), Sunni nationalists, and Sunni Islamists.  
While Sunni tribal groups are largely concerned with their regional power and prestige 
vis-à-vis neighboring tribes, FRLs are mainly motivated by a general desire to nationally 
reestablish the “Old Guard” in power, or at a minimum, prevent this power from falling 
into the hands of the Shi’ites.  With the capture of many high-ranking Ba’athists, the 
FRLs have become operationally inactive, functioning largely as financiers of other 
                                                 
3  Faleh A. Jabar, “Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under 
Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998,” in Totaliarism and Tribalism: The Ba’th Regime and 
Tribes, eds. Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: Saqi, 2003), 75.     
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groups.  Iraqi nationalists gained many of their numbers from FRL groups, and are 
motivated primarily by their desire to expel foreign forces to insure that Sunni Arabs 
retain the political authority in Iraq.  Indigenous Iraqi, Sunni Arab Islamists are another 
sub-category, acting as a cohesive force between some insurgent groups, and allowing for 
cooperation between Sunni groups and transnational jihadists.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the “Sunni” categorization of the insurgency is used for Iraq’s Sunni Arab 
population.  While the majority of Iraq’s Kurds are also Sunni, they will be dealt with 
separately in the “transnational” chapter.  This chapter focuses on the unique social 
factors behind the Sunni insurgent groups, as well as the motivations and basis for tribal, 
FRL, nationalist, and Islamist insurgent groups. 
3. The Transnationals 
The collapse of the Ba’athist regime also created a tremendous power vacuum in 
Iraq which had once been filled by a repressive state security mechanism.  The overnight 
disappearance of this form of authoritarian control allowed a multitude of independently 
motivated groups to pursue their own individual interests.  In this way, the 
transnationalists are probably the most diverse typology of the Iraqi insurgency, 
incorporating a variety of different social, religious, ethnic, and economically motivated 
groups.  Despite this, they all contain similarities, and for the purpose of this thesis I 
define transnational insurgents using two criteria; Those insurgents that have a greater 
interest in their specific group, organization, or political agenda, than in the future of the 
state of Iraq, and insurgent groups with “sustained continuous interactions with 
opponents – national or nonnational – by connected networks of challengers across 
national boundaries.”4  Based on these factors, I focus this chapter on Iraq’s three largest 
transnational groups, specifically the Islamic Jihadists, Kurdish elements, and large, 
economically motivated criminal groups.  For the purpose of my thesis I will differentiate 
between religiously motivated indigenous Iraqis and “jihadists”.  I will classify jihadists  
                                                 
4  Sidney Tarrow, “Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics” 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 184.   
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as transnational, ideologically motivated fighters that use religion as their justification for 
acts of violence “directed against people they believe are their enemies and the enemies 
of their way of life.”5 
 
C. THE NECESSITY FOR DISAGGREGATION 
With the variety of differences between insurgent groups and their social bases, a 
thorough disaggregation of the insurgency is crucial to policy formation for the coalition 
authorities in Iraq.  Lumping all insurgents together, with similar policies for all, has 
resulted in mistakes during the coalition’s tenure and will likely compound future 
decisions with regard to a coalition counterinsurgency strategy. 
Immediately following the collapse of the Ba’athist regime in the spring of 2003, 
the United States made a series of policy errors stemming from a general lack of 
understanding of the social groups from which Iraq’s insurgent groups arose.  In the 
south, American policymakers recognized the significance of Shi’ite power brokers such 
as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani far too late.  The result of this was a failure on the part 
of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to open proper dialogue channels through 
which to pass information, show respect, and monitor the conditions for an insurgency.  
Due to this lack of cooperation, coalition authorities found themselves face to face with a 
large Shi’ite insurgency just over a year later.  In the central provinces, America’s 
complete disregard for Iraq’s tribal structure and its political significance lead to the rise 
of multiple disjointed Sunni tribal insurgencies, intent on jockeying for power and 
adamant about not being disenfranchised by Iraq’s new government.    
Armed with a more detailed understanding of the driving factors behind each 
typology and its subsets, coalition policy makers will be able to avoid the pitfalls of past 
decisions, and create a more effective counterinsurgency strategy, flexible enough to 
target specific groups.  Whereas some insurgent groups such as the Shi’ites or tribal 
Sunnis, have a stake in the future of Iraq, others, such as the jihadists do not.  U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy needs to be able to reconcile this with policy, more effectively 
                                                 
5  Mary R. Habeck, “Jihadist Strategies in the War on Terrorism,” in Policy Research and Analysis 
(Washington D.C.:  The Heritage Foundation, 8 November 2004), available from 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl855.cfm; Internet; accessed 5 March 2005.    
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directing political and financial resources toward our long-term partners in Iraq, and 
military pressure toward those who have no stake in the country’s future. 
 
D. STAKES AND SIGNIFICANCE 
At this point, Iraq’s insurgent groups have gained the strategic initiative, dictating 
the coalition’s operational tempo through the use of asymmetrical tactics, which do not 
require an American withdrawal for victory, but merely their group’s own survival.6  The 
need for a new, more effective counterinsurgency strategy based on a better 
understanding of the insurgents has become imperative, and this directly related to the 
stakes involved.  Whereas America had relatively little to loose in its hasty withdrawal 
from other recent guerilla movements, such as Somalia, far more is at risk in Iraq.  With 
an estimated 115 billion barrels of known oil reserves, and 110 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, Iraq maintains the world’s second largest cache of crude oil and one of the 
world’s largest stores of natural gas.7  Militarily, Iraq is extremely significant to the 
United States.  Its geographical location not only makes it an ideal bulwark against the 
perceived threat of Iran, but Iraq also could provide the U.S. military with basing 
facilities to replace its slow but seemingly inevitable departure from Saudi Arabia.  
Beyond military and energy interests, the United States has also invested a great deal of 
financial, human, and political capital in Iraq, making a perceived loss in Iraq another 
blow to America’s tattered international credibility, and social psyche.  On an ideological 
level, the United States has a far deeper interest in seeing Iraq stabilize and prosper, as a 
revitalized Iraq would offer “an alternative to oppressive Islamic fundamentalist regimes 
and repressive authoritarian secular regimes.”8  America’s failure to realize this goal  
                                                 
6  James A. Russell, “Strategic Implications of the Iraq Insurgency”, Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 8 (June 2004), 51.   
7  Energy Information Administration, “Iraq Country Analysis Brief,” (November 2004), available 
from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html; Internet; accessed 2 March 2005. 
8  Andrew Krepinevich, “Iraq and Vietnam: Déjà vu All Over Again, Part II of II,” in Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: Backgrounder (8 July 2004), available from 
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20040702.IraqViet/B.20040702.IraqViet.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 2 March 2005.  
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would be a victory for militant Islamic fundamentalists, and a serious setback to the Bush 
Administration’s declared mission to “promote democracy (as) a prelude to our enemies' 
defeat.”9  
                                                 
9  President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, Transcript (20 January 2005), available from 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/20/bush.transcript/; Internet; accessed 2 March 2005.  
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II. THE SHI’ITES:  OVERVIEW AND CURRENT STATUS 
On 4 April, 2004, the United States and its coalition allies in Iraq were faced with 
a serious problem.  For the first time, coalition forces had been engaged in armed 
confrontation by a Shi’ite insurgent group.  The rise of a Shi’ite militia into armed 
combat with coalition units posed a major setback to provisional authorities and coalition 
military planners, as it not only signaled the dawn of a “two-front” insurgency within 
Iraq, but alluded to the fact that Iraq’s previously quiet Shi’ites were losing patience with 
the coalition and Iraq’s interim government.  Even more worrisome was the fact that 
Shi’ite Muslims comprise the majority of Iraq’s sectarian groups, and the sudden rise of a 
large Shi’ite insurgency could signal the appearance of a new enemy, far larger than 
coalition forces had been dealing with to date.   
In comparison with other insurgent groups in Iraq, the Shi’ite insurgency is truly a 
distinctive phenomenon.  Far more cohesive than its transnational and Sunni 
counterparts, the Shi’ite insurgency in Iraq has proven to be relatively singular in nature 
and generally willing to obey its clerical leadership.  Led by the fiery young cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr, the Mahdi Army became Iraq’s Shi’ite insurgency, rallying thousands 
of armed young men into the streets of southern Iraqi cities and Baghdad’s Shi’ite slums.  
For several months into the fall of 2004, American military forces endured multiple 
attacks and fought a series of battles against the Mahdi Army in what appeared to be a 
complete loss of control of southern Iraq.  Finally on 26 August 2004, after a widely 
televised and heated battle through the streets of the holy Shi’ite city of Najaf, and with 
the return of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani from medical treatment in London, al-Sadr 
agreed to withdraw the Mahdi army from Najaf.  In the weeks that followed, American 
“clean up operations” in the poor Shi’ite neighborhoods of Baghdad, as well as internal 
demands within Iraq’s Shi’ite community, ostensibly pressured the Mahdi Army into a 
slow disarmament and conversion from militia to political movement.   
While these events have seemingly eliminated the Mahdi Army as a military 
threat, the speed with which the Mahdi Army arose and the size of this insurgency 
warrants further study.  Beyond this, Iraq’s large Shi’ite population is a tremendous 
resource for insurgents, capable of providing a determined group with ample logistical 
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support for continuous operations.  In addition, the Shi’ite insurgency within Iraq has 
deep roots, drawing on social characteristics of Iraq’s Shi’ite communities that were 
tempered by decades of persecution.  This history of repression has also given the 
Shi’ites a clear motivation, as the fall of Saddam’s regime and hopes for democracy in 
Iraq have provided Iraqi Shi’ites with a long sought window of opportunity for majority 
political representation.  The ideological dynamic of this insurgency also has deep roots, 
stretching back to the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the leadership of several Iraqi 
Shi’ite clerics influenced by the teachings of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini.  These are all extremely important factors to consider when attempting to 
understand the origin and motivation of the Shi’ite insurgency, as well as the tactics and 
goals of this movement.   
Despite the fact that the Mahdi Army seems to currently be closed down, this 
could change rapidly in the coming months if the Iraq’s Shi’ite community and ulama 
feel that they have been cheated or left out of Iraq’s new political process.   In essence, 
the small taste of a Shi’ite insurgency serves as an important reminder of what the United 
States could face in the future.  In this respect, a critical examination of this insurgency 
and its historical basis will greatly aid policymakers in not only understanding the cause 
and effect relationships of the past, but in avoiding similar mistakes in the future. 
In this chapter, I focus on the Shi’ite insurgency in Iraq as unique, distinct from 
the Sunni and transnational insurgencies.  I demonstrate the importance of the legacy of 
repression among the Shi’ites and their disenchantment with the United States through an 
examination of this community’s recent history.  I also provide an overview of the Mahdi 
Army and its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, noting the specific characteristics of this insurgent 
group, as well as the ideological basis for the movement.  Despite the apparent 
cohesiveness of Iraq’s Shi’ite community, I show that the al-Sadr movement was far from 
monolithic, and widely unpopular within Iraq’s diverse Shi’ite community.  Divergent 
religious and political tendencies that were repressed under Saddam Hussein, have once 
again arisen.  Different opinions among the Shi’ite clerical leadership are especially 
important, and had a role in ending the al-Sadr movement.  Finally, I conclude by 
explaining the significance of the al-Sadr movement despite its current dormant status. 
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A. ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES:  A LEGACY OF 
REPRESSION 
One of the most significant differences between the Shi’ite insurgency and other 
Iraqi insurgent groups, is that the Shi’ite insurgency arises from a social group which had 
been previously disenfranchised.  Whereas many of the Sunni insurgent groups are 
fighting because they have lost power, the Shi’ite insurgency arose largely to insure that 
they get power in a system that has historically excluded and repressed them.  While 
Sunni elites have ruled the territory that we now know as the state of Iraq for the better 
part of the last millennia, Iraq’s Shi’ite community comprises the numerical majority of 
its population.  Due to the minority Sunni rule in this region, no current accurate census 
results are available on the exact number of Shi’ites in Iraq.  British census data from 
1919 estimated the number of Shi’ites in Iraq as 53% of its population, and this number 
was adjusted in 1932 to reflect that Shi’ites accounted for 56% of the populace.10  Recent 
estimates on the number of Shi’ites in Iraq are even higher, indicating that they account 
for between 60 and 65 % of Iraq’s 24 million citizens.11  Given Iraq’s current population 
growth rate of 2.7 %, Iraq will have a population of over 31 million by 2010.12  Future 
investment in southern Iraq and an end to the sanctions which have sapped this area of its 
service infrastructure will help in widening the gulf between the number of Sunnis and 
Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population.  Iraqi Sunnis are well aware of the growing Shi’ite 
population, and the threat that this poses to the possibility of Sunni rule, especially within 
any sort of democratic system of government.   
The idea that the Shi’ites represent a threat to Iraq’s Sunni power base is not a 
new realization.  By the mid-1970s, Iraq’s Ba’ath Party came to recognize the 
numerically dominant Shi’ites as their principle rival for power and legitimacy.  Over the 
course of the past thirty years, this fear was managed through the institutionalization of 
Shi’ite repression under the Ba’athist regime.  Using the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
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Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Al Dawwa al-Islamiya Party (The Islamic Call), Shi’ite 
activists attempted establish a political voice in Iraq against the ruling Sunni elite.  This 
opposition to the Ba’athists was ruthlessly crushed after rioting in 1974, and again in 
1977, through a bloody purge of the Shi’ite ulama in Najaf. The Ba’athist regime 
executed five clerics in 1974 and eight in 1977.  Although stripped of political power, the 
Dawwa party became the centerpiece for Shi’ite resistance to Ba’athist persecution as 
disgruntled Shi’ites began looking for answers and ways in which to shrug off the mantle 
of repression.  Led by the charismatic Shi’ite cleric, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the 
Dawwa party received both financial and political support from Iran, which sought to 
undermine the Ba’athists in Baghdad.  These events were not completely unknown to the 
Iraqi regime, and by the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Ba’athist leaders already 
had their eyes keenly fixed on southern Iraq as a potential threat to their monopoly over 
political power.     
The Sunni repression of Iraq’s Shi’ite communities continued until the fall of the 
Ba’athists on 9 April 2003.  In retrospect, and given America’s track record in southern 
Iraq, the Shi’ites half-hearted support for coalition forces after occupation should have 
come as no surprise to U.S. policymakers.  From their perspective, the Shi’ites of Iraq 
have good reasons to be wary of American, coalition, or interim government promises.  
Iraqi Shi’ites saw the U.S. withdrawal from southern Iraq following the first Gulf War as 
an unforgivable betrayal, as many Shi’ite leaders had anticipated U.S. ground forces to 
liberate them from Saddam’s regime.  On 11 March 1991, a final desperate request for 
American assistance by Shi’ite Imam Abd al-Majid al-Khoei was ignored by U.S. 
policymakers who maintained that their mission had been the liberation of Kuwait, and 
the necessity to “remain neutral.”13   
Within the month, the departure of American forces from southern Iraq saw the 
rallying of Saddam’s Republican Guard units to obliterate Shi’ite resistance in the South.  
In the months that followed, Saddam took further revenge, using the uprising as an 
excuse to purge the Shi’ite communities of any possible militants, opposition, and radical 
elements.  A confirmed tally of the dead was never released, but unconfirmed reports 
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estimate that upwards of 100,000 Shi’ites were slaughtered in Saddam’s swift and bloody 
reprisals.14  In the wake of this perceived betrayal, many local Shi’ite leaders and clerics 
were also executed, thousands of Shi’ite civilians fled to the countryside, and anti-
American resentment within Iraq’s Shi’ite communities began to grow. 
Over the next decade, the Shi’ites of southern Iraq remained locked under the 
blanket of a largely U.S. monitored “no fly zone”, and a continuing tit-for-tat stalemate 
between U.S. warplanes and elusive Iraqi anti-aircraft systems.  The eventual result was 
exactly the opposite of what American policy-makers and U.N. officials had hoped for.  
The U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq had failed to uproot the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad 
and Saddam Hussein had actually consolidated his power through adroit political 
maneuvering and the manipulation of tribal alliances.  Saddam never forgot or forgave 
what he saw as Shi’ite treason, and he used all the tools at his disposal to punish the 
Shi’ite communities of southern Iraq.  United Nations sponsored economic sanctions 
meant to hurt Saddam’s regime were brought to bear against the southern Shi’ites, 
resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands, largely because of starvation, disease, 
and the inadequacy of basic social services.  Oil revenues were diverted north, and 
massive development projects such as the construction of “Saddam’s Canal,” and the 
draining of the southern marshes had unprecedented effects on the Shi’ites of Iraq.  In 
what has been viewed as one of the worst man-made ecological disasters in history, the 
loss of Iraq’s fertile southern marshes deprived millions of Iraqi Shi’ites of their 
traditional croplands and subsistence.  The result of this campaign against the Shi’ites 
was their virtual withdrawal from the limelight of Iraqi politics and increasing mistrust of 
Western policies in Iraq.  Other than a few sporadic incidents, the Shi’ites in southern 
Iraq remained relatively quiet during this time, badly scarred by Saddam’s brutality in 
1991 and wary of American promises.   
In the spring of 2003 and at the cessation of major combat operations, Iraq’s 
Shi’ite community refrained from actively sponsoring attacks on coalition forces, 
preferring to quietly “wait and see” what the future would hold.   While Muqtada al-Sadr 
had begun building the Mahdi Army as early as the summer of 2003, this Shi’ite group 
had refrained from engaging coalition forces for almost a year.  During this time,                                                  
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coalition forces were becoming increasingly committed to fighting a growing Sunni 
insurgency in central Iraq.  As the months wore on, Shi’ite leaders began to worry about 
the possibility of an American-Sunni alliance, aimed at stemming the Sunni insurgent 
problem.  This move would cut the Shi’ites out of the new government, or at minimum, 
under-represent their communities.  America’s close relationships with neighboring 
Sunni countries did not help this perception, as many Sunni Arab leaders, especially 
those in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, still remain fearful of a Shi’ite led Iraq.  The concerns 
of Shi’ite leaders grew with the initial Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) proposed 
plan for an Iraqi interim government which called for local caucuses.  Feeling that this 
plan was vulnerable to external tampering, Grand Ayatollah Sistani refused to support the 
CPA, calling for immediate elections.15   
With time and several Sunni-sponsored attacks in the South, Shi’ite patience 
began to wane, and by the spring of 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr had made a name for himself 
around the world through his inflammatory criticism of the United States and the Iraqi 
provisional authority.  The turning point marking the evolution of the Mahdi army into a 
violent insurgency followed shortly.  This transition was prompted by two distinct 
incidents in the spring of 2004 indicating a peak in tensions between al-Sadr and coalition 
forces.  In March of 2004, U.S. forces oversaw the closure of al-Sadr’s newspaper, al-
Hawzah.  The newspaper had been printing over 10,000 copies a week, and according to 
U.S. officials, al-Hawzah was being disseminated with “intent to disrupt general security 
and incite violence.”16  The same month, U.S. forces, in an effort to pressure al-Sadr to 
step down his rhetoric, arrested one of his closest aides, Mustafa al-Ya’qubi, who was 
taken into custody by Iraqi officials on the suspected involvement in the murder of 
moderate Shi’ite cleric Imam Abd al-Majid al-Khoei in April of 2003.  In April of 2004, 
less than a month after Ya’qubi’s arrest, the Iraqi government issued a warrant for the 
arrest of al-Sadr on related charges.  With al-Sadr’s sudden personal involvement at stake 
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and mounting tensions between the Mahdi Army and the coalition authority, conflict 
became unavoidable. 
 
B. THE MAHDI ARMY AND AFFILIATES 
In comparison with other sectarian or national groups in Iraq, the Shi’ite 
community has produced only one major insurgency (the Mahdi Army), with its own 
demographic.  This section will examine the Mahdi Army and the involvement of foreign 
affiliates in supporting this movement, noting specific tendencies of this insurgent group 
which have made it unique in comparison with Iraq’s other insurgent movements.     
While the Sunni and transnational insurgent groups have taken on various shapes 
with a variety of different goals, the Shi’ite insurgency in Iraq has been comprised almost 
exclusively of the Mahdi Army, headed by the young Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.  
Estimates of the number of insurgents in the Mahdi Army have ranged from 10,000 to 
15,000 fighters, not including logistical or passive support.17  The group’s fighters are 
mostly young, disaffected Iraqi men from al-Kut and the slums of Baghdad’s Shi’ite 
neighborhoods.18  With unemployment rates at nearly 70%, these areas were prime 
targets for al-Sadr, who rallied followers by citing Iraq’s postwar lawlessness, “lack of 
basic services in Shi'ite urban areas, and coalition disregard for the cultural and societal 
norms of the population.”19  Incentives also helped to increase al-Sadr’s numbers, as he 
reportedly recruited many of his fighters “with offers of money and welfare for their 
families.”20  The preponderance of their weapons were looted after the war, bought 
cheaply on the black market, or simply brought home by former Iraqi soldiers following 
the disbanding of the Iraqi Army.  Because of this, most of the Mahdi Army’s weapons 
are considered man-portable light arms, such as automatic rifles, rocket propelled 
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grenades, homemade bombs, and mortars.  Practicing in garbage dumps and outlying 
areas, the vast majority of the Mahdi Army’s cadre is also poorly trained, lacking any 
significant degree of instruction on firing doctrine and small unit tactics.  Beyond this, 
without a sound logistical base and long-term sustainability, “al-Sadr's forces were not 
successful in either taking or holding positions when faced with a high-quality, 
aggressive coalition force opponent.”21    
Another critical difference which marks the Shi’ite insurgency as different from 
other groups is the participation of state-sponsored elements in supporting the Mahdi 
Army.  While the bulk of al-Sadr’s forces may have been poorly trained youths, 22 Badr 
Corps, Lebanese Hizballah, and even Iranian involvement in supporting the Shi’ite 
insurgency is highly probable.  “Military sources” from within Iraq have reported that al-
Sadr is “being aided directly by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard” and by Hizballah.23  While 
there is no hard evidence linking these groups directly to violent attacks, the possibility of 
support and future involvement cannot be discounted.  The Badr Corps is of especially 
grave concern, as the extensive training of its members, equipping, and political 
indoctrination provides the Shi’ite community within Iraq a ready-trained insurgent force.  
With the Ba’ath Party’s expulsion of thousands of Shi’ite activists during the 1970s and 
1980s, these elements began to congregate and mobilize under the protection and support 
of Iran.  They eventually formed the Badr Corps, a strongly anti-Saddamist paramilitary 
force based in Western Iran.  This organization was composed of 10,000 militiamen, 
funded by Iran and trained by Iran’s clerically controlled military force, the Pasdaran.24  
Well armed and well supplied, the Badr Corps consisted of infantry, armored, artillery, 
anti-aircraft, and commando sections.  Their strategy was to establish a strong resistance 
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within Iraq, mobilize Iraqis in exile, and eventually overtake the Ba’athist regime and 
install an Islamic government.   
With the downfall of the Ba’athist regime and the ensuing chaos, it is unclear 
exactly how many Badr Corps members filtered back into Iraqi society, bringing with 
them training, experience, and possibly even weapons.  In recent months, the SCIRI has 
fallen under the leadership of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who has chosen to participate in 
Iraq’s new government by endorsing the SCIRI as a legitimate party.  In addition to this, 
the SCIRI has also made great efforts to convince both Iraqis and U.S. policymakers that 
it has no intentions on destabilizing Iraq and that the Badr Corps is no threat to the future 
stability of Iraq.  The SCIRI’s leadership has gone further to prove their innocence of the 
post-war violence by stating that their militia forces have discarded their heavy weapons 
in an effort to work within the system, and the SCIRI has even changed the name of the 
Badr Corps to the Badr Organization in an attempt to move away from its militant 
image.25  Regardless of the SCIRI’s public statements and purposeful distancing from the 
Mahdi Army, there is no guarantee that at least a portion of the thousands of armed and 
well trained Shi’ite fighters did not lend support to their Shi’ite countrymen, who share 
the same Khomeinist ideals. 
Statements by Iranian defectors and Arab newspaper sources have not been as 
vague and have indicated far more direct Iranian involvement in supporting the Mahdi 
Army.  A source within the Quds Army, the section of the Pasdaran responsible for 
training foreign groups, told Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper that al-Sadr had been allowed 
to set up three camps in the cities of Qasr Shireen, ‘Ilam, and Hamid, in Iran for the 
purpose of training 800-1,200 of his supporters in military tactics.26  In a different 
interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a defected Iranian Intelligence official who had been 
active in postwar Iraq claimed that Iranian intelligence agents had crossed into Iraq, using 
18 Shi’ite charities in Kazimiya, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, Nasriyah, Basra, and 
other cities with sizable Shi’ite populations, to recruit militants under the pretext of 
providing social services.27  The same source also claimed that following the coalition 
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invasion of Iraq, Iran had been spending over 70 million dollars a month in Iraq to 
support their activities “both covert and overt.”28  This notion of foreign government 
intervention or even sponsorship of insurgent groups is significant, as it adds a new 
dimension to influences on, and possible magnitude of a Shi’ite insurgency.  
 
C. MUQTADA AL-SADR AND HIS POPULARITY 
Using his familial ties, clerical relationships, and Iraqi national identity, Muqtada 
al-Sadr became the centerpiece for the rise of the Mahdi Army.  Through the successful 
exploitation of common Iraqi sentiments for jobs, security, and a coalition withdrawal, al-
Sadr was able to build a following from the poor Shi’ite communities of Iraq.  This 
section will examine Muqtada al-Sadr’s personal and familial characteristics, which 
enabled him to rapidly gain a short-lived burst of popularity and create a Shi’ite 
insurgency in Iraq.     
The popularity of Muqtada al-Sadr among Iraqi Shi’ites and his ability to rally 
such a large number of supporters in a short period of time can be attributed to several 
factors.  His familial ties and tribal connections are probably his greatest credits, as al-
Sadr was a household name that had been associated with Shi’ite activism in Iraq well 
before Muqtada had begun his clerical studies.  Muqtada al-Sadr is the son of former 
Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and nephew of former Grand Ayatollah 
Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr.  Considered to be “the most prominent intellectual figure 
among the Shi’i radical ulama of post-monarchic Iraq”, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr was 
one of the founders of the Shi’ite Dawwa Party, and directly responsible for bringing the 
fundamentalist notion of Islamic government into Iraq.29  The murder of Mohammad 
Baqir al-Sadr at the hands of Iraqi security forces in April of 1980 only helped to increase 
the al-Sadr family’s standing as martyrs for the Iraqi Shi’ite cause.  
In a culture where familial ties and tribal affiliations are extremely important, 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s family also holds seyyed status, which maintains that he is a direct 
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descendent of the Prophet Mohammed.30   Beyond his tribal affiliations, the fact that the 
al-Sadr family is of Iraqi origin in a society where the majority of ranking Shi’ite clerics 
have been of Iranian origin, is also extremely significant.  Muqtada has been able to use 
this to his advantage, giving the fundamentalist Mahdi Army an Iraqi nationalist flavor, 
which has greatly increased the appeal of the al-Sadr movement among Iraqi Shi’ites. 
Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr also left his son an inheritance that 
has helped his legitimacy.  Following his assassination in February of 1999, Muqtada al-
Sadr took control of his father’s organization.31  Prior to his death, Muhammad Sadiq al-
Sadr had developed a reputation among Iraq’s Shi’ites as an outspoken activist of the 
Natiqah (vocal) school, and as a popular mujtahid (Jurist).32  He had also won support 
among many of Iraq’s poor, urban, Shi’ites through his charity work and his calls for an 
end to Iraq’s social injustice through the foundation of an Islamic state.33  In honor of his 
service to the community, Iraq’s Shi’ites even renamed Baghdad’s poor suburb of 
Saddam City to Sadr City.  The result of this legacy was an existing social base of 
legitimacy and support for Muqtada al-Sadr, from which he could draw followers.    
While Muqtada al-Sadr has made a conscious effort to establish the Mahdi Army 
as an Iraqi movement, a considerable difference between this movement and other 
insurgent groups is the degree of legitimizing support that al-Sadr has been able to garner 
from his relationship with Iranian clerics.  Of notable significance is al-Sadr’s 
relationship with hard-liner Iranian Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Ha’eri, supporter of the 
precedence of Islamic law in government, and close friends with al-Sadr’s father, 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr.  Upon his death, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr 
had left instructions that his followers take direction from Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-
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Ha’eri, and since May of 2003, frequent visits between al-Sadr and clerics in Tehran have 
caused U.S. policymakers to pay even more attention to this connection.34  Due to his 
close relationship with al-Ha’eri, al-Sadr even had arranged to have himself designated as 
the “special representative of the Ayatollah”, allowing him to “speak with considerable 
religious authority despite his youth and lack of theological standing.35   Ha’eri himself is 
considered to be strongly anti-American and has “repeatedly warned the Iraqi public that 
U.S. forces are occupation troops and not liberation forces.”36  This support continued 
until last summer, when al-Ha’eri publicly stripped al-Sadr of this title.  Until this time, 
the young cleric enjoyed a great deal of relatively unchecked authority which allowed 
him to build, train, and equip the Mahdi Army with the backing of older, well respected 
Iranian clerics.   
A final reason for al-Sadr’s popularity is far more simplistic and emotional.  In 
the aftermath of the Ba’athist fall, many Iraqis came to see U.S. forces as occupation 
troops, which had come to Iraq to usurp power as well as reap the political and economic 
benefits of occupation.  Frustrated Shi’ites who had lived under Sunni repression now 
worried about the possibility that they would be living under foreign repression, and Iraq 
would never truly be autonomous of the United States.  With the heavy footprint of 
American forces in Iraq on their minds, many Iraqi Shi’ites saw the transfer of Iraqi 
sovereignty on 30 June 2004 as a sham.37  Other credentials aside, al-Sadr began to win 
popularity among Iraqi Shi’ites based on what was perceived as an act of courage in 
defiance of an increasingly American controlled Iraq. 
 
D. GOALS AND IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE AL-SADR MOVEMENT 
The Al-Sadr Movement in Iraq had three basic stated goals: The preservation of 
Muqtada al-Sadr from imprisonment; the expulsion of foreign forces from Iraq; and the 
establishment of a Shi’ite Islamic government in Iraq based on Khomeini’s model in Iran.  
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When looking at Iraq’s other insurgent groups, only the expulsion of U.S. forces from 
Iraq can be held in common with the Sunni and transnational categories. 
The first, and clearly the most basic goal of al-Sadr’s Movement was simply to 
protect himself from what he perceived as his impending arrest at the hands of a U.S. 
puppet government.  With the closure of al-Hawzah and the arrest of Mustafa al-Ya’qubi, 
al-Sadr was confident of a U.S. led effort to arrest and silence him.  The explosion of 
violence in the spring of 2004 and the accompanying media attention established 
Muqtada al-Sadr as a new force to be reckoned with in Iraq, and his popularity soared.38  
Well aware that the United States could not afford to make the young cleric a martyr, al-
Sadr had successfully maneuvered himself into a safe zone, not only starting a movement 
that increased his popularity, but simultaneously saving himself from a jail cell.   
The next goal of al-Sadr’s movement was attractive to many Iraqis, even those 
who did not share al-Sadr’s extremist religious views.  He demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, a notion which appealed to the nationalist pride 
of many Shi’ites and Sunnis alike.  While al-Sadr obviously did not succeed in driving 
out foreign forces, his nationalist oriented message brought him not only followers, but 
sympathizers as well, who were frustrated by Iraq’s poor social services, employment 
rate, and pervasive security environment since the fall of the Ba’athists. 
The final goal of Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement is a deeply ideological one, which 
involves Ayatollah Khomeini’s notion of the precedence of Islamic law and clerical rule 
in government.  Although this notion of Islamic government was used as the ideological 
backbone for the al-Sadr movement, the roots of this concept predate the 2003 Iraq war 
by several decades.  It was during the 1960s and early 1970s that the shrine city of Najaf 
played host to what was to become some of the most influential religious scholars in 
history, including Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Mushin al-Hakim, Muhammad Baqir 
al-Sadr, Musa al-Sadr, Ibrahim al-Amin, and Hassan Nasrallah.39  During this time, new 
and innovative ideas surfaced amidst regional currents of communism, socialism, Arab 
nationalism, and capitalism.  One of these concepts was Ayatollah Khomeini’s wilayat-i  
faqih, or “guardianship of the state.”  Wilayat-i  faqih is “predicated on the belief in the 
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Islamic state as the best form of government,” and it was Khomeini’s assertion that it was 
the ulama’s responsibility to take guardianship of the state as they might do of an 
orphanage or hospital.40  Khomeini believed that instead of doing nothing, Shi’ite 
activism through guardianship of the state was necessary in preparation for the arrival of 
the twelfth Imam, or Mahdi.     
The Iranian Revolution was born out of this period of radicalization, and in and of 
itself it was probably the single greatest inspiration for Shi’ite fundamentalists 
worldwide.  Its effects were felt in mosques throughout the world, as Shi’ite 
fundamentalism had been able to establish the world’s first modern Islamic state.  This 
was incredibly significant on multiple levels, as “the new masters in Iran considered 
themselves to be the true standard-bearers of Islam.”41  In essence, the success of the 
Iranian Revolution was used as a self-righteous promotion of Shi’ism over Sunni Islam, 
supporting the notion that Shi’ism is the true path of Islam, succeeding where Sunni 
fundamentalism had failed.  While celebrated by Iraqi Shi’ites, this arrogance was 
rejected by Sunni leaders throughout the Muslim world.  In the long term, it also 
functioned to build Arab support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and his 
repression of Iraq’s Shi’ite communities.   
Beyond the triumph of Shi’ism, the Iranian revolution also demonstrated the 
power of the masses, “that a movement springing from a broad spectrum of society could 
bring down a powerful government.”42  In fact, the Iranian revolution had succeeded in 
the face of incredible resistance, including an organized and brutal state mechanism 
known as the Savak, meant to destroy Iranian internal dissent through intimidation, 
torture, and murder.  The revolution had also been accomplished despite Iran’s powerful 
western allies, most notably the United States.  All of this combined to give Islamists, 
specifically Shi’ite Islamists, a tremendous boost in courage and moral self-
righteousness.  Shi’ite clerics in Lebanon, Iraq, and other parts of the Middle East were 
given a new hope and conviction.  Inspired by these events, former Grand Ayatollah 
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Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr became 
tremendous proponents of the politicization of clerics and their involvement in 
government.  Following in the footsteps of his Khomeinist oriented relatives, al-Sadr is 
also an advocate of the Iranian model of the precedence of Islamic law in the new Iraqi 
government.   
The principle of the Wilayat-i  faqih is at the very heart of the al-Sadr Movement 
and this deeply-rooted ideological basis sets the Shi’ite insurgency apart from many of 
Iraq’s other insurgent groups.  As opposed to the Sunnis or transnationals, the Wilayat-i  
faqih provided Muqtada al-Sadr with a plan for the future of Iraq from the onset, and a 
historical legacy on which to base this plan..  Despite this, the notion of an Islamic 
government was not a vision supported by most of Iraq’s Shi’ites, and has brought 
Muqtada al-Sadr into direct conflict with Iraq’s more traditionalist Shi’ite clerics.  The 
most celebrated of these traditionalists has been Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has 
advocated a more “quietist” role of the Shi’ite clergy, emphasizing the separation of 
religious and state authority. 
 
E. CLERICAL DIVISIONS, AYATOLLAH SISTANI, AND THE END OF 
THE AL-SADR MOVEMENT 
The divisions among Iraq’s Shi’ites, especially within the Shi’ite clerical 
leadership, played a large part in the rise and fall of the al-Sadr movement and are likely 
to continue being a driving force behind decisions made within this community.  While 
Muqtada al-Sadr was able to rally thousands of extremely vocal and active supporters, his 
followers still comprised a minority group within Iraq’s Shi’ite population, most of 
whom identified with Ayatollah Sistani and his more traditionalist perspectives on Islam 
and politics.    
In retrospect, it is possible that al-Sadr became a pawn in a much larger game and 
was unwittingly used by far more senior and influential clerics.  Given al-Sadr’s general 
lack of professional standing and young age (which is heavily disputed), some have 
speculated that there were other forces at work behind the Shi’ite uprisings, deliberately 
allowing al-Sadr to consolidate the Mahdi Army through their inaction.43   In one line of 
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thinking, the motivation for allowing al-Sadr’s rise could have been twofold, limiting al-
Sadr’s growing popularity on one hand, while simultaneously sending a warning on the 
part of Iraq’s senior clerical leadership, who were beginning to run short on patience with 
the progress of the post-war political reconstruction of Iraq, and who felt that they were 
“beginning to loose the upper hand in their long-term dealings with Washington.”44  A 
massive Shi’ite insurgency in southern Iraq lead by a politically expendable upstart could 
refocus Washington’s attention.  Muqtada al-Sadr was more than willing to comply, as 
the xenophobic firebrand cleric had already begun to make statements about the need to 
drive out the coalition occupiers, and follow in his family footsteps as a radical proponent 
of the Wilayat-i  faqih.    
By the summer of 2004, it is possible that Iraq’s senior clerics thought that their 
point had been made, and when the Shi’ite insurgency began to threaten the physical 
safety of Iraq’s shrines, these clerics began to check al-Sadr’s power.  As early as May of 
2004, Shi’ite clerics began discussing the al-Sadr issue, and on 6 May, approximately 150 
of Iran and Iraq’s most senior Shi’ite clerics and their representatives convened in 
Baghdad to decide their next move with regard to al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army.45  By 
June, many of Iraq’s previously passive Shi’ite tribal and religious leaders also began to 
slowly distance themselves from al-Sadr, showing that they were “willing to limit his 
influence and apply pressure in order to constrain his actions.”46  In the months that 
followed, Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Ha’eri publicly broke his connection with al-Sadr, 
politically marginalizing him, and “Shi’i clerics reportedly pushed for aggressive 
coalition operations against the Mahdi Army up to the very boundaries of the holy 
sites.”47  While this strong internal pressure on the al-Sadr movement was the trigger for 
its eventual demise, much more deeply rooted factors, such as the diverse nature of Iraq’s 
Shi’ite community, undercut this movement. 
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F.   THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE AL-SADR MOVEMENT AND SHI’ITE 
DIVERSITY 
At the end of August 2004, and with American Marines only blocks away from 
the Imam Ali Mosque, Muqtada al-Sadr gave in to internal Shi’ite pressures, interim 
government demands and coalition military coercion, and left Najaf for Sadr City.  Al-
Sadr’s fall was largely due to societal factors beyond the application of military force and 
clerical politics.  At the onset of hostilities between the Mahdi Army and coalition forces 
in May of 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr was at the height of his popularity, boasting a 68% 
popularity rating among Iraq’s estimated 15 million Shi’ites.48  Regardless, only two 
percent of Iraq’s Shi’ites approved of al-Sadr as a presidential candidate at this time.49  
Even more telling, was al-Sadr’s noticeable absence from Iraq’s political limelight in the 
country’s first democratic elections in decades.  A coalition of over 22 different Shi’ite 
parties congregated under an election bloc known as the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) for 
the January 2005 elections.  Multitudes of Iraqi Shi’ites including Ayatollah Sistani, and 
even Ahmed Chalabi have prominent roles in the new parties.  Despite this, the names of 
al-Sadr and his chief lieutenants were not listed among the bloc’s 228 candidates.50  In 
less than six months, Muqtada al-Sadr went from being one of the most known and 
influential Iraqi Shi’ites, to not even offering representation in the election.  
Superficially, the singular nature of this insurgency, the strong clerical leadership 
of the Shi’ites, and a legacy of historical repression at the hands of Sunnis, gave this 
community an image of unity and the Mahdi Army the appearance of a popular 
movement.  In truth, the Shi’ite insurgency was not a monolithic phenomenon, and was 
embraced by only a small percentage of Iraq’s population.  While many Iraqis within this 
community may have sympathized with their Shi’ite countrymen, desired for the 
departure of foreign troops, and were inspired by Muqtada al-Sadr’s courage, few were 
truly committed to an Islamic government, the use of violence, and the al-Sadr movement 
in the long-term.  The al-Sadr movement also had some “personal” characteristics, which 
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made it unpalatable to the general Shi’ite population of Iraq.  Lacking the appropriate 
training and titles, Muqtada al-Sadr is far too young to have any significant degree of 
clerical authority.51  Due to this, and what appears to be “coat tailing” on his father’s 
reputation, many Iraqi Shi’ites looked unfavorably on al-Sadr’s moves for power.  Also, 
al-Sadr’s use of the term “Mahdi” to describe his group of insurgents enraged many 
Shi’ites who feel that the under-qualified al-Sadr is making the not-so-subtle suggestion 
that he may be the returned twelfth Imam.  The general unpopularity of al-Sadr and his 
Mahdi Army is underpinned by wide divisions within Iraq’s Shi’ite community and 
diversity with regard to politics and Shi’ite views on the future of Iraq. 
Iraq’s Shi’ites are by no means homogenous in their socioeconomic, ethnic, and 
political demographics.  “There are secularists (including liberals and communists) and 
various religious groups, urban and rural dwellers, rich and poor, Shi'ites who have never 
left Iraq and those who have spent decades in exile.”52  Clear divisions within the UIA 
highlight the diversity among Iraqi Shi’ites, as the bloc’s 22 parties have a variety of 
different agendas.  Al-Dawa and SCIRI are the UIA’s two largest Islamist parties, but the 
UIA also has smaller less known Islamist parties focusing on specific issues, such as the 
Islamic Virtue Party.  The Iraqi National Congress (INC), is secular, and one of the 
largest parties in the UIA.  The Turkmen Fidelity Movement, Islamic Union for Iraqi 
Turkomans, Fayli Kurd Islamic Union, and Islamic Fayli Grouping in Iraq are UIA 
Shi’ite parties with an ethnic focus, representing many of Iraq’s non-Arab Shi’ites.  
Hezbollah, an organization with long historic ties to Iran, has also sponsored two parties 
within the UIA Shi’ite coalition.  While not on the UIA list of political parties, the 
Communists have historically drawn support from poor Shiites in southern Iraq.  
Founded in 1934, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) is Iraq’s oldest political party, 
originally embraced by Iraqi Shi’ites before gaining popularity among middle-class 
Sunnis.53  This extremely diverse set of political parties with their own distinct agendas is 
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reflective of the wide divisions among Iraqi Shi’ites.  Understanding this diversity is 
useful in explaining not only the downfall of the al-Sadr movement, but the general 
nature of Iraq’s Shi’ite community. 
 
G.  SIGNIFICANCE  
Despite its current status, the al-Sadr Movement is significant since it 
demonstrates that the Shi’ite insurgency differs from the Sunni and transnational 
insurgencies.  A great deal of this arises from the historical repression that the Shi’ites of 
Iraq have endured, and the revolutionary influences of Shi’ite fundamentalism.  In 
addition, the conscious effort on the part of Iraq’s senior clerical leadership to manipulate 
and undermine al-Sadr in order to manage the political atmosphere within post-war Iraq, 
is also informative and unique to the Shi’ite insurgency.  The clerics’ willingness to allow 
an insurgency to continue, aided by their own passive inaction, in order to make a 
political point, followed by their ability to help quiet this insurgency through internal 
pressure, speaks volumes on the power and influence of Iraq’s senior clerical leadership, 
particularly that of Ayatollah Sistani.  The general loyalty of Iraq’s Shi’ite communities 
to their religious leadership is also important.   
As opposed to the highly factionalized Sunni communities, Iraqi Shi’ites have 
proved to be fairly loyal to their clerical leadership, showing tremendous restraint against 
taking up arms in the immediate months following the U.S. occupation of Iraq.  Iraq’s 
Shi’ite clerics, most notably Grand Ayatollah Ali Husaini al-Sistani, urged patience and 
civil obedience in the wake of the Ba’athist collapse, and the Shi’ites of southern Iraq 
generally listened.  Recent polls support the notion that Iraq’s Shi’ite clergy holds a great 
deal of influence over the Shi’ite population.  In survey conducted by the Department of 
State Office of Research prior to the January 2005 parliamentary elections, 87% of 
eligible Iraqi Shi’ites sated that they would vote but 76% of the respondents also said that  
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they would boycott the election if directed by a trusted Shi’ite leader.54  This indicates a 
tremendous degree of influence which cannot be ignored by American policymakers or 
Iraq’s new government.  
Most significant is the fact that the rise and fall of the al-Sadr movement was 
underpinned by Iraq’s extremely diverse Shi’ite community and a variety of different 
political, economic, and religious agendas.  These agendas are becoming clearer as 
Shi’ite political parties form under Iraq’s new government, and we will likely see even 
greater rifts within this community as Iraqi Shi’ites become more comfortable with free 
participation in the new system.  While many of Iraq’s Shi’ites may have initially 
supported the al-Sadr movement for an array of reasons, the sheer diversity of the 
community undercut general long-term support the Mahdi Army.    
 While the last several months have seen the ostensible “turn in” of many of the 
Mahdi Army’s weapons at U.S. sponsored collection centers, and the Mahdi Army seems 
to have quietly taken a seat, it would be unreasonable to think that the Mahdi Army is 
completely disarmed.  With regard to the future of Iraq, the most important aspect of 
Iraq’s Shi’ite movement “has less to do with its current capabilities and more to do with 
its potential threat.”55  The rapid rise of such a singularly large and determined insurgent 
force from Iraq’s Shi’ite community is extremely worrisome.  This is especially true 
when considering the fact that the Mahdi Army was lead by a cleric who was only 
popular for a brief period of time, and garnered substantial sustained support only among 
a minority of Shi’ites.  With this in mind, the rise of a full-blown Shi’ite insurgency 
under the direct public control of a far more popular cleric such as Sistani, could produce 
an insurgency on a monumental level and force an indefensible situation for American 
policymakers and military officials.  This is a possibility that must be considered, and the 
small taste of a Shi’ite insurgency last year was hopefully enough to remind U.S. officials 
that Iraq’s Shi’ites have a massive stake in the future of Iraq, and they are willing to 
influence their position by force if need be. 
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III. THE SUNNIS: OVERVIEW AND CURRENT STATUS 
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the central provinces in Iraq have been the most 
violent, with the greatest number of insurgent incidents and the strongest anti-coalition 
resistance.  It is in a permissive environment that Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups have 
flourished, carrying out their planning, recruitment, training, and operations under the 
nose of the more powerful coalition forces.  Armed attacks, bombings, and intimidation 
campaigns are part of daily life in central Iraq.  Since the spring of 2003, over 35 Sunni, 
Arab insurgent groups have claimed responsibility for acts of violence throughout Iraq.56  
Duplication errors are possible, as certain groups may use multiple names or have 
changed their names, but it is also likely that smaller local groups exist which coalition 
sources have not yet identified.  Beyond the sheer number of Sunni insurgent groups, “an 
overwhelming majority of those captured or killed have been Iraqi Sunnis, as well as 
around 90-95% of those detained.”57  While the coalition has made significant strides in 
cooperating with local authorities and maintaining general stability in some Kurdish and 
Shi’ite areas, central Iraq remains and will likely continue to be a difficult challenge for 
coalition policy makers.  It is in this respect that a critical analysis of Iraq’s most fierce 
insurgency involving the Arab Sunnis of central Iraq must be undertaken.   
This chapter is directed toward understanding the diverse nature of the Sunni 
insurgency, examining the common goals of this categorization, as well as the 
motivations of sub-categories and their individual groups.  The Sunni insurgency is 
divided into four primary groups; Ba’athists/former regime loyalists (FRLs), Iraqi 
nationalists, regional tribal groups, and indigenous Iraqi Islamists.  While Sunni tribal 
groups are largely concerned with their regional power and prestige vis-à-vis neighboring 
tribes, FRLs are mainly motivated by a general desire to reestablish the “Old Guard” in 
power nationally, or at a minimum, prevent this power from falling into the hands of the 
Shi’ites.  Iraqi nationalists are the most diverse sub-category, motivated primarily by their 
desire to expel foreign forces and insure that Sunni Arabs retain political authority in 
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Iraq.  Sunni Arab Islamists are also discussed, including the impetus for their revival, 
their functioning as an inter-group cohesive force, and the divergence of these indigenous 
Iraqi Islamists from transnational fundamentalists operating in the country.   
I pay special attention to the historical significance of tribes in Iraq’s politics, and 
how Saddam Hussein manipulated these tribes through gifts and political machinations in 
order to consolidate his power.  In this way, the Sunnis are shown to have been the big 
losers after the war. They have multiple motivations for insurgency, including bitterness 
resulting from a loss in power and prestige, fear of the potential power of the numerically 
superior Shi’ites in a politically democratic Iraq, and nationalist sentiments opposed to 
any American presence in Iraq.  Divisions among and between these insurgent groups 
lack absolute definition, as coalition military operations and pressures internal to Iraq 
have forced the consolidation of many such groups over the past year, allowing for 
cooperation between Iraqi Sunni groups.  In presenting these points, this chapter 
demonstrates the unique social factors behind the Sunni insurgent groups, their 
motivations, and relations with each other. 
 
A. ORIGINS:  THE SUNNIS UNDER THE BA’ATHISTS  
Arab Sunni Muslims only make up approximately 30 to 35 percent of Iraq’s 
population.  In general, they are concentrated in a roughly drawn triangle between Tikrit 
in the North, Ramadi in the West, and Baghdad in the East, creating a region known as 
the “Sunni Triangle.”  This region provides the insurgents with the ability to move freely 
and openly in terrain that they are not only familiar with, but which also affords them the 
ability to maintain extensive logistical and support networks.   
The Sunnis have been a ruling minority over Iraq’s Shi’ites for centuries, 
enjoying the social, political, and economic rewards of their position.  Even prior to the 
Ba’athists, Ottoman Sunnis had run Iraq for centuries, eventually replaced by British-
installed Sunni Arabs, who filled the country’s top political seats.  The rise of the 
Ba’athists in Iraq not only continued, but took this legacy of a Sunni minority rule to a 
new level, empowering this population with the wealth of Iraq’s natural resources.  In the 
spring of 2003, the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government brought an end to this 
system and largely disenfranchised the Sunni Arabs and their associated power structures.  
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This section examines Iraq’s Sunni population, interpreting its preferential treatment 
under the Ba’athists as background to the roots of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. Despite their 
historical minority rule, Arab Sunnis benefited further by the rise of the Ba’athists to 
power.   
Sunni domination was not always the case within the Ba’ath party, and in many 
respects, Iraq’s Shi’ites were useful in bringing the Ba’ath party to power.  Once in place 
however, the party’s Shi’ites were successively driven out of powerful positions.  Before 
1968, the Shi’ites had substantially more power within the Iraqi Ba’ath party.  From 1952 
until 1963, Iraq’s Shi’ites maintained 53.8% of the party’s 53 top command seats, in 
comparison to the Sunni’s 38.5%.58  With the rise of the Ba’ath party to power in 1968, 
this fairly representative demographic changed greatly.  Between 1963 and 1970, Arab 
Sunnis came to hold 84.9% of the party’s top commands, with Arab Shi’ites in only 5.7% 
of the top positions.59  By 1977, the disparity had grown and Sunni Arabs thoroughly 
dominated the Ba’ath party, holding 93.3% of the organizations top command posts.60  
The locales from which the party’s members came were also heavily concentrated in 
central Iraq, with an increasing number of upper echelon party officials and decision-
makers hailing from Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit.             
In 1979, Saddam Hussein took power.  In the years that followed, due to the 
country’s oil wealth, the GNP multiplied. “[B]y the early 1980s, the state bureaucracy 
was about 25 percent of the total workforce, and a new class of entrepreneurs, contractors 
and managers reaped much of the benefits of Iraq’s wealth.”61  This new middle class of 
government bureaucrats and contract employees was heavily Arab Sunni, bringing the 
country’s new oil money and investment into central Iraq.  Other major government 
programs devoted to housing, literacy, health, and education catered to the Arab Sunnis 
as well, focusing largely on urban areas in central Iraq and depriving the Iraqi north and 
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Shi’ite southern areas of an equitable distribution of money and resources.62  Opposition 
movements and uprisings by the Kurds and Shi’ites fueled Hussein’s neglect of these 
areas.  
While Iraq’s economy suffered greatly in the 1990s, socio-economic disparity 
between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’ite populations continued to grow, and by the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, southern Iraq had been devastated by poverty and years of neglect.  The 
implementation of United Nations-imposed sanctions failed to dislodge the regime.  
Instead, the result was Hussein’s manipulation of the allocation of basic social services, 
aid, and foodstuff distribution in order to keep the Kurds and Shi’ites under control.   
   
B. THE CHANGING NATURE OF BA’ATH PARTY’S TRIBAL 
RELATIONS  
Iraq’s Sunni population benefited greatly from the Ba’athist minority rule of 
Sunni Arabs.  While Saddam Hussein did receive political support from some Shi’ite 
tribes during his presidency, the vast majority of Hussein’s tribal affiliations were 
Sunni.63  Through a complex system of gifts and endowments, not unlike those used by 
the British in the mandate or tribally-based countries currently, Hussein established his 
principle base of political support with Iraq’s Sunni Arab tribes from the late 1980s until 
his fall in 2003.  Ba’athist support for Iraq’s tribes was not always the case, as Iraq’s 
earliest Ba’athists saw tribes as rivals for power and legitimacy.  This led to a series of 
social, economic, and political measures enacted by the Ba’athists, which greatly reduced 
the power base of Iraq’s tribal sheikhs.  It was not until the late 1980s and especially the 
1990s that Iraq’s Ba’athists began to cooperate with the tribes, revitalizing their power 
base in a quid pro quo relationship that was mutually reinforcing, beneficial to the regime 
and the tribes.  During Saddam Hussein’s presidency, these traditional tribal power 
structures were revitalized through political favors in order to further legitimize, 
consolidate, and insulate his power.  The fall of the Ba’athists in the spring of 2003 
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brought an abrupt end to this relationship, as well the tremendous benefits of power and 
prestige that this relationship brought to the Sunni Arabs of central Iraq.  The legacy of 
this reversal of fortune for the Sunnis has been the rise of a multi-faceted Sunni 
insurgency.   
Prior to the mid-1980s the Ba’ath Party had a relatively adversarial relationship 
with Iraq’s tribes.  Upon taking power in 1968, the Ba’athists issued their first public 
communiqué, opposing traditional linkages by stating that the Ba’athists “are against 
religious sectarianism, racism, and tribalism.”64  There were a variety of philosophical 
and practical reasons why the Ba’athists initially sought to weaken and marginalize Iraq’s 
tribal networks.  Ba’athism is an activist, revolutionary and modernizing political 
ideology, focused on “effecting a structural transformation in the spirit and thinking of 
the Arab people which would revolutionize their society.”65  It is based on the “trinity” of 
unity, freedom, and socialism which became manifested in modern, secular socialism and 
pan-Arabism.66  This clearly runs counter to traditional tribal-based notions of 
governance.  Iraq’s new Ba’athists saw tribalism as an antiquated system, which eroded 
their principles of pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism.  Whereas Ba’athism is centered on 
the predominance of the state, traditional tribalism produces a sub-national network of 
loyalties.  These loyalties hold familial bonds the strongest and allegiances weaken as one 
moves farther from the family, through the tribal chain and into general society.  Because 
of this, Ba’athists came to view tribalism as an alternate social support structure and form 
of legitimacy that challenged the primacy of the Iraqi state.  Further, Iraq’s rural-based 
tribal sheikhs also represented a competing social class, as the Ba’athist ranks were 
largely made up of lower-middle class youths from urban areas.67     
The Ba’athists used a variety of different social, political and economic measures 
to control and limit the power of the tribal sheikhs.  These policies were aimed largely at 
the country’s most powerful tribes in an effort to check their power.  The most prevalent 
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and effective technique used by the Ba’athists was land reform.  Iraq’s tribes were 
principally rural, gaining power through land ownership and patron-client relationships 
between tribal sheiks and the peasants who worked the land.  The three primary land 
reform policies undertaken by the Iraqi government were aimed at limiting tribal land 
ownership, creating worker associations and cooperative farming.68  In some cases, the 
Ba’athists even resorted to land seizure as part of this strategy.  These new policies 
undercut the peasant-sheikh tie by forcing the Iraqi government into the middle of this 
relationship or by completely replacing the tribal sheikh.  Whereas the sheikhs and tribe 
had once been the support structure for administering agriculture, Iraqi peasants became 
increasingly autonomous from this traditional system, receiving resources and assistance 
from the state.69  Demographic trends during the latter half of the twentieth century did 
not help the rural sheikhs either.  Urban industrialization coupled with large migrations 
out of rural areas and into the cities also undercut the sheikh’s power base by depriving 
them of loyal partisans and a workforce.   
While Iraq’s Ba’athists had toyed with notions of tribal policy prior to the late 
1980s, these policies had been instituted unevenly, and largely to curb the power of tribes 
which the Ba’athists perceived as threats.  The primary impetus for tribal revitalization 
came in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, when Saddam Hussein began searching for more 
domestic support and an internal check against the growing possibility of an Iraqi Shi’ite-
Iranian connection.70  Hussein’s efforts to revitalize the Sunni Arab tribes quickened after 
the first Gulf War, when he found himself faced with massive insurrections by the 
Shi’ites in the south and the Kurds in the north.  By the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein had 
realized these internal threats to his regime, and embarked upon a domestic campaign of 
tribal revitalization.  Eventually, Hussein’s “manipulation of traditional social networks 
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and identities (became) an instrument of expanding his own power base and mobilizing 
the broader masses at minimal risk to his own authority.”71  
Economic legitimacy had also become a major problem for Saddam Hussein, and 
by the late 1980s a serious downturn in Iraq’s economy had begun to take its toll on Iraqi 
civil support for their government.  Wide ranging economic liberalization and 
privatization programs were instituted by Saddam Hussein in an attempt to kick start the 
Iraqi economy in the wake of falling oil prices and the tremendously destructive Iran-Iraq 
war.  The reforms were extremely sudden, with deep economic and social consequences.  
Labor unions were disbanded, price controls were removed, international investment 
opportunities were opened, the vast majority of Iraq’s foodstuff manufacturers were 
privatized, and by 1989, 88% of Iraq’s agricultural land was privately owned.72  Lacking 
any degree of complementary political liberalization measures and institutional market 
backing, these policies began to fail.  “By the summer of 1990, these reforms, coupled 
with pressures from international creditors, plunged the economy into such chaos that not 
even the experienced repressive apparatus of the Ba’ath party could guarantee domestic 
political stability.”73  The aftermath of these failures, combined with Iraq’s loss to 
coalition forces during the first Gulf War and the resulting U.N. sanctions, had a 
devastating impact on the regime’s legitimacy.  Thus, Hussein’s courting of the tribes and 
establishment of a new base of support became necessary for regime survival.   
There were a variety of reasons that Saddam Hussein chose Sunni tribal Arabs as 
his vanguard and base.  The first and most obvious reason deals with Hussein’s own 
personal origins.  A Sunni Arab from Tikrit, Hussein knew that he could rely upon his 
own kin and tribesmen for unquestionable support.  In addition to this, Hussein saw the 
tribal Sunni Arabs as possessing inherent characteristics, which made them extremely 
desirable for high government and military positions.  Traditional qualities such as 
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courage, honor, and a sense of community were typically associated with tribal Arabs by 
Hussein, who also saw them as the most truly Iraqi and therefore the most loyal.74 
The association that Saddam Hussein developed with Iraq’s Sunni tribes became a 
give and take relationship in which both sides benefited.  Hussein was able to draw on the 
preexisting tribal networks as an immediate means to categorize and control Iraqis.  He 
used these affiliations to pressure individual Sunni Arabs into stronger allegiances to the 
state, as he held tribes responsible for the actions of their individual members and 
individuals responsible for the actions of their greater tribes.75  Many Iraqi Sunnis found 
themselves in a collective action dilemma, where they were forced to act in compliance 
with the regime or bring ruthless consequences upon themselves, as well as their family, 
friends, and village.  Using the tribes, Hussein also shored up the legitimacy of his 
government through this increased support.  He was also able to insulate his regime from 
any potential internal threats by heavily populating the Republican Guard, Special 
Republican Guard, and critical government posts with trusted Sunni tribal Arabs.  
Despite the control mechanisms placed on Sunni Arab tribes and their sheikhs, 
they also profited greatly from their relationship with Baghdad.  Whereas the 
institutionalization and enforcement of tribal control mechanisms through torture, 
imprisonment and intimidation became the stick, political favors to tribes, gifts, and 
prestige became the carrot.  Tribal locales that provided Saddam Hussein with backing 
received infrastructure improvements such as new roads, schools, and hospitals.  Hussein 
also strengthened his relationships with sheikhs through personal visits and expensive 
gifts.  Some tribes were even allowed carry out their own smuggling operations and 
administer their own system of tribal law, autonomous from state control.76  While 
Hussein could rely on Sunni Arab tribesmen to protect him from internal threats, the 
tribal sheikhs relied upon Hussein to provide them with jobs, promotions, and prestigious 
appointments that would be certain to bring money and power back to the tribal locale.  
This quid pro quo system of favors between the government and sub-national groups is 
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not unique to Iraq, having been used throughout history by autocratic rulers as well as 
colonial powers who have sought to legitimize their rule.  In Iraq, this network of favors 
brought Sunni tribesmen well under Hussein’s control creating a “sense of asymmetrical 
debt towards the sheikhs and, across them, to the central power.”77       
By 2003, the Sunni Arab tribes had strong linkages with the Ba’athist government 
through an institutionalized network of Ba’ath-tribal relations.  The removal of Saddam 
Hussein from power and dismemberment of the Ba’ath Party structure destroyed this 
system of political interdependence from which the tribes benefited.  U.S. and coalition 
soldiers were not seen as liberators, but instead as enemy occupiers that signaled an end 
to decades of power, prestige, and preferential treatment.   
 
C. SUNNI INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS, GOALS, AND STRATEGY 
Although Sunni insurgent sub-groups have specific differences, which will be 
examined in later sections, the majority of Iraq’s Sunni Arab insurgents maintain a basic 
set of political, economic, and social motivations which are at the center of this 
categorization.  Politically, Sunni insurgents are concerned that the new government will 
result in Shi’ite empowerment at their expense.  Economically, the aftermath of the war 
has been devastating to employment rates and civil infrastructure.  The result has been a 
plummeting standard of living and soaring unemployment among Iraqis, especially those 
who had previously relied upon the state for jobs, particularly Sunni Arabs.  Socially, 
many of the Sunni Arabs are still bitter about their sudden loss of power and prestige 
alongside the Ba’athist regime.  Social disorder and civil lawlessness following the war 
contributed to this bitterness, as many Iraqis have not only been subjected to insurgent-
motivated intimidation campaigns, but widespread criminal activity as well.   
One of the primary goals of the Sunni insurgents is to impede a democratic 
process in the country’s new government.  Given that Shi’ites are Iraq’s largest sectarian 
faction, the country’s Sunni Arabs are legitimately fearful of the political power that a 
democratic system could give this historically repressed group.  These fears rise from not 
only their general loss of political power, but the possibility that a new Shi’ite 
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government may enact retribution which will disenfranchise the Sunnis.  It is in this 
respect that many Sunni insurgent attacks are undertaken to destabilize and delegitimize 
the system.  Even attacks against Iraqi civilians further their efforts, showing Iraqis that 
their government is powerless to stop the insurgency and lacks the simple ability to police 
and protect its own people.  While the recent January elections were carried out despite 
the insurgent threat, Sunni insurgents still have a vested interest in attempting to 
destabilize the government. 
Economic woes among Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are one of the leading causes of the 
insurgency.  After the seizure of Baghdad by coalition forces in the spring of  2003, it 
was estimated that over 100,000 FRLs from Iraq’s various security forces became 
unemployed overnight, heavily concentrated in central Iraq, and retaining a wide variety 
of weapons.78  Whereas Iraq’s Sunni Arabs once occupied many of the country’s most 
prestigious and critical jobs, this population now has an unemployment rate of 30 - 40 
percent.79  Time has not helped, as poverty, joblessness, and the lack of basic social 
services continues for many Sunni Arabs.   
Even Sunni Arabs who have cooperated with coalition forces have been cynical 
about the coalition’s ability to improve economic conditions and infrastructure in the 
country’s central provinces.  One local Sunni leader from central Iraq described the 
aggravation of this predicament, stating that “if the Americans came and developed our 
general services, brought work for people and transferred their technology to us then we 
would not have been so disappointed.  But it is not acceptable to us as human beings that 
after one year America is still not able to bring us electricity."80  This process has become 
a vicious cycle in all of Iraq, as security concerns due to the ongoing insurgency have 
limited foreign investment and construction, offering the Iraqis who live in dangerous 
areas little hope for improving their economic situation and quality of life.   
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Socially, Iraq’s Sunni insurgents have two principle motivations stemming from 
their loss of power and prestige, and frustration with regard to the crime and civil unrest 
following the fall of Saddam Hussein.  The end of the Ba’athist regime terminated 
decades of benefits and rewards for Iraq’s Sunni Arabs.  Young Sunni Arab men were no 
longer assured good jobs through familial connections and tribal alliances.  The 
prestigious social positions and lifestyle enjoyed by fathers was no longer a guarantee for 
their sons.  The fact that the population is extremely young does not help this situation, as 
thousands of young, unemployed Iraqis, many with former military training and ready 
access to weapons, create a very large pool of bodies upon which insurgent groups can 
draw.     
Beyond bitterness related to the loss of social benefits is a general sense of Sunni 
frustration from Iraq’s lack of civil order.  Immediately prior to the U.S. led invasion of 
Iraq, Saddam Hussein let over 200,000 criminals out of Iraq’s prisons, worrying the 
Sunni Arab middle and commercial classes and creating an environment rife with 
criminal activity.81  Local criminal gangs blended with local tribal elements, Islamists, 
and organized insurgent groups, creating a complex mosaic of social lawless.  The result 
greatly affected Iraq’s former commercial and middle class of Sunni Arabs, polarizing 
them and pressuring them to comply with insurgents and criminals in the face of a 
government and coalition which has been largely unsuccessful in ending the violence, 
banditry, and intimidation in the central regions.  In essence, the coalition’s inability to 
stem the violence and crime in this area has not only discredited it, but also lost any 
potential to win the Arab Sunni middle class as an ally in the short-term.   
These various motivations for Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups have brought them 
together with one common goal, the expulsion of foreign forces from Iraq.  As long as 
coalition forces remain in Iraq, so will the threat of a democratic government which 
accommodates the numerically superior Shi’ites and guarantees a loss of Sunni prestige 
and power.  In this way, coalition military forces are the greatest impediment to insurgent 
groups in Iraq.  In contrast with al-Sadr, the Sunnis do not seem to have a concrete 
ideological program for the future of Iraq.  Expelling foreign forces and derailing the 
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government are essentially “negative” goals, focusing largely on what the Sunni 
insurgents do not want as opposed to a “positive” goal, such as a vision for the country’s 
future.82  This perspective superficially gives the Sunni insurgency a largely rejectionist 
and destructive flavor.  
Indeed, recent events have indicated that instead of choosing to participate in the 
new government, insurgent groups have focused on eroding the existing political 
structure and security apparatus.  A Department of State survey conducted three weeks 
prior to the January elections supports this assertion.  While the Sunni electoral boycott 
was a factor, intimidation and security concerns were the primary reasons for the low 
Sunni voter turnout.83  “Voters in Baghdad, and the predominantly Sunni cities (were) 
less sure about voting because of security concerns.  Nearly half in Baghdad and Kirkuk, 
and two-thirds in Tikrit/Baquba (were) very concerned about their family’s safety on 
election day, compared to a quarter or fewer in other areas.”84  Ninety one percent of 
those surveyed in the mainly Sunni Arab areas of Tikrit and Baquba also said that they 
would stay home if there were threats of violence against polling stations, as opposed to 
only 43% in the south and 21% in the mid-Euphrates regions.85  Prior to the election, 
insurgents were able to capitalize on these fears by elevating the level of intimidation 
through leaflets, graffiti, armed attacks, and televised murders, which resulted in the 
resignation of some election officials.86   
The first official January 2005 election results indicated that insurgent’s 
“negative” campaign of intimidation was successful.  These figures showed the highest 
voter turnouts were in Shi’ite and Kurdish areas, with 71% turnout in the ethnically and 
religiously mixed province of Babil, and an 89% voter turnout in the Kurdish province of 
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Dohuk.87  Diyala province, one of Iraq’s predominantly Sunni central provinces, reported 
the lowest voter turnout, with only 34% of eligible voters making it to the polls.88  No 
final turnout figures were released for the Sunni Arab provinces of Al-Anbar and Salah-
al-Din provinces, two of Iraq’s most violent provinces.  Iraq’s influential group of Sunni 
clerics, the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), called the January elections invalid 
due to this disparity.89  Whether Sunni Arabs chose to stay home due to unwillingness to 
participate in the system, security concerns, or outright terrorization, the increased 
intimidation campaign prior to the election and its effects on Sunni voter turnout seems to 
show support for the negative approach of the Sunni insurgency.   
The Sunni insurgents may have realized that coalition forces are unbeatable in a 
pitched battle, due to a preponderance of military hardware, organization, and technology 
at their disposal.  This was demonstrated in Fallujah, when American military forces 
pushed through the insurgent’s stronghold in a matter of days, killing over 1,000 
fighters.90  Thus, the insurgents have sought to wear down coalition forces through 
terrorism and partisan warfare, hoping to destroy the will of the coalition soldiers and the 
support of the American population at home.  To this end, the insurgents have sought “to 
create a state of permanent political violence in the Sunni region, effectively pitting the 
new Iraqi transitional government, backed by the U.S.-led coalition, against the Sunnis in 
a sustained conflict.”91  They have done this by competing with coalition forces and the 
new government for control over political and military authority in the Sunni areas of 
central Iraq.   
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A variety of strategies have been employed by the insurgents, targeting 
infrastructure, Iraqi “collaborators” and coalition forces.  Infrastructure has been a 
common target.  By depriving Iraq’s citizens of social services, the insurgents aim to 
show the government is ineffective, illegitimate, and in this way “impoverish the Iraqi 
people and capitalize on a sense of frustration.”92  The insurgents have also tried to 
subvert the government by preventing Iraqis from working within the new system and 
with coalition authorities.  This has occurred through intimidation campaigns, 
kidnappings, and the murder of Iraqis participating, employed, or affiliated with the 
coalition.   ISF personnel working with coalition military units have been targeted in 
numerous attacks, assassinations, and bombings against ISF personnel and facilities.  In 
addition to security personnel, political figures working with the coalition and within the 
new government have also been targeted.   
Other than the tactic of killing civilians, insurgents have also sought to drive a 
wedge between coalition military units and civilians by creating the conditions where 
coalition planners need to take stringent measures in order to insure security.  While this 
was apparently tolerated during the January elections, continued coalition 
counterinsurgency measures, which make life difficult for Iraqi citizens, can demonstrate 
the coalition to be oppressors rather than protectors, in the insurgents’ view.93  By 
undermining all other forms of authority, the Sunni insurgents have defined their strategy 
around the notion that “resistance is the only legitimate means of political expression” in 
a country run by foreigners and traitors.94    
The ostensibly destructive and “negative” approach of the Sunni insurgency 
appears to be focused on subverting factors which could stabilize or add legitimacy to the 
coalition or the new Iraqi government.  Despite this, the Sunni insurgents may indeed 
have long-term goals, attempting to consolidate their territory to allow self-policing.  This 
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could be behind what appears to be a negative campaign to thwart the advent of a 
democratic government.  Armed attacks, bombings, and intimidation campaigns may be 
part of this, in an effort to homogenize their territory, or in the case of tribal insurgents, 
their immediate locale.  Through territorial homogenization, insurgents would be able to 
create a “niche” in the new Iraq, providing them with more of an opportunity for 
autonomy from the government and protection from its anticipated Shi’ite dominated 
politic.     
 
D.   FORMER RÉGIME LOYALISTS / BA’ATHITS  
Anticipating military defeat, Hussein had begun drawing up plans for a partisan 
insurgency prior to the coalition invasion of Iraq.95  Saddam Hussein’s relatives, tribal 
relations, senior government officials, and fedayeen (Men of Sacrifice or paramilitary 
guerillas) forces were at the core of this plan, pledging their lives to Hussein and his 
service.  Immediately following the capture of Baghdad, FRLs were among the first 
insurgents to begin resisting coalition forces.  Well supplied with arms and ammunition 
from existing Iraqi military stockpiles, these insurgents also had the advantage of an 
instantly available chain of command taken from the vestiges of the Ba’athist regime.   
By mid-2003, multiple groups of Hussein supporters had arisen, such as the 
General Command of the Armed Forces, Patriotic Front, and Iraqi Liberation Front.96  
Most of these groups were composed of former Ba’ath party members, Special 
Republican Guard units, former mukhabarat (state security) personnel, Iraqi intelligence 
personnel, and Hussein’s fedayeen paramilitary personnel.97   Their initial goals seemed 
to revolve around the creation of an environment so hostile that coalition forces would 
need to withdraw from Iraq.  This would afford the country’s former leadership the 
opportunity to seize power again, and subdue Iraq’s domestic turmoil through force.  
Slowly, this goal became increasingly unrealistic, as Iraq’s senior Ba’ath party members 
and government officials comprising the “deck of cards” were captured or killed through 
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coalition operations.  The capture of Saddam Hussein on 13 December 2003 was a 
logistical and psychological blow to this group, and many of the FRLs’ immediate goals 
came to an end.  With this, FRLs started to realize that too many of the Ba’ath party’s 
leaders had been captured or eliminated to successfully reinstall a Ba’athist regime in the 
short-term.  FRL insurgents began leaving this sub-group for Sunni nationalist, Islamist, 
or other insurgent groups.98  The loss in leadership and personnel caused a shift in the 
priorities of the FRLs, focusing on utilizing other insurgent groups to create widespread 
civil disorder in Iraq, in an attempt to drive out coalition forces.   
While the Sunni FRL insurgency is now operationally defunct due to leadership 
and supporter losses, FRL elements remain active and have congregated in a Sunni 
insurgent group known as Al-Awdah (The Return).  This insurgent group consists mainly 
of former Iraqi intelligence personnel, who have focused their activities on logistically 
supporting and funding other insurgent groups.99  Although not actively engaged in 
insurgent operations, financing has allowed Iraq’s remaining Ba’athists and FRLs a role, 
using the manpower of other insurgent groups for legwork. 
 
E.   IRAQI NATIONALISTS 
Despite the fact that many of this sub-category, the  Iraqi nationalist groups, 
oppose the return to power of the Ba’athists, they area natural evolution of FRL 
insurgents following the capture of the Ba’ath party senior leadership.  With a limited set 
of options, many FRL insurgents lost their allegiance to the Ba’athist regime following 
the capture of Saddam Hussein, and began seeking other resistance groups to join.  The 
progression from FRL allegiances to nationalist ones is intuitive, as Iraqi nationalist 
groups encompass not only insurgents using religious idioms but secular ones as well.  
The primary difference between Iraqi nationalist insurgents and the other sub-categories 
lies in group loyalties and goals.  Whereas tribal groups have loyalties dedicated to the 
tribe and Islamists are dedicated to a specific reading of Islam, Iraqi nationalists are 
motivated by patriotism, their allegiance to the state, and a desire to insure Arab, Sunni 
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dominance in the new government.  Unlike the last remaining Ba’athists, Arab Sunni 
nationalist insurgent groups are not intent on reviving the Old Guard, and they are 
operationally active, carrying out a wide range of attacks primarily in central Iraq.   
The past two years of intense coalition counter insurgency operations have 
allowed for a merging of Iraqi insurgent groups.  Whereas the first few months after the 
fall of the Ba’athist regime were marked by the rise of dozens of insurgent groups, the 
past year has seen a congregation of these individual insurgent organizations into loosely 
aligned partnerships.  The National Front for the Liberation of Iraq (NFLI) and the Iraqi 
National Islamic Resistance (the 1920 Revolution Brigades), are two of these coalitions.  
These coalitions have brought together a variety of differing smaller insurgents groups, 
which may have had, and even retained tribal, ethnic, or Islamic ideas, but are focused on 
Iraqi nationalism for the benefit of Arab Sunnis.   
  
F.   TRIBAL INSURGENTS 
The Sunni tribal groups may be the most numerous and active insurgent groups.  
Due to their small size and multiple nature, these groups have been some of the most 
difficult for coalition forces to understand and target in the post war insurgency.  Tribal 
insurgent groups may take the shape of organized fighters under the leadership of a tribal 
sheikh or a neighborhood militia protecting a specific locale from outsiders.  While many 
of the Sunni tribes benefited from Hussein’s rule, others did not, creating rifts among 
tribal insurgents.  Tribal insurgents also have a variety of ideological beliefs.  Some are 
more secular or nationalist, others tied to Islamist ideals, receiving guidance from Sunni 
clerics.  Despite these differences, tribal insurgent groups all share two distinct 
characteristics: they are highly localized and their primary allegiance is to the tribe.   
Although most tribal insurgents have a nationalist or Islamist flavor, their main 
loyalties lie first with their tribe.  Heavily concentrated in Al-Anbar, Diyala, and Salah-
al-Din provinces, tribal insurgents maintain strong power bases in Tikrit, Fallujah, and 
Ramadi.100   Tribes are tied to their local territory, and because of this, are sensitive to 
geographical boundaries.  These boundaries may divide agricultural land, desert, or even 
cities, leading to neighborhoods with specific tribal characteristics.  Therefore, tribal                                                  
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based insurgents are suspicious of outsiders and respond not only to coalition military 
incursion, but anyone newcomers to their locale.  This notion of difference is at the core 
of tribal xenophobia, producing different standards of virtue and tolerance that can 
produce a altruism within the tribe but “mean spirited partiality” directed against those 
perceived to be “different.”101   
Loss of status and power after the fall of Saddam Hussein has had a great deal to 
do with general tribal animosity toward coalition forces.  Tribal honor and a general 
unwillingness to submit to any form of outside control is another motivation, unique to 
the tribal insurgents.  Other motivations exist, and although Sunni tribal insurgents have 
no desire to see a Shi’ite-dominated government in power, their immediate operational 
moves are reactionary based on local factors.  The two major influences on tribal 
operations seem to be the coalition presence in Iraq and tribal perceptions of their power 
relative to neighboring or rival tribes.  Tribal responses have taken the shape of IEDs and 
armed attacks, directed at coalition units, government officials, ISF personnel, or any 
“outsiders” cooperating with the coalition such as international groups or NGOs.   
Another complicating factor unique to tribal insurgents is the significance of 
inter-tribal conflicts.  While tribal insurgents may be fighting coalition units and any 
outsiders who come into their locales, they are also concerned about their relative power 
in relation to neighboring tribes.  Long-standing feuds among tribes have become part of 
the violence, pitting tribes against each other.  Tribal favoritism under Saddam Hussein is 
at the center of this, as some benefited and other uncooperative tribes were persecuted.102  
Tribes that profited from Hussein’s regime were largely concentrated in central Iraq, and 
included the “Jubbur in Sharqat, the 'Ubayd in al-'Alam and Tarmiya, the Mushahadah in 
Tarmiya, the Luhayb in Sharqat, and the al-'Azza in Balad.”103  Other tribes located 
farther north, such as the “Harb in ad-Dur, the Tayy in Mosul, the Khazraj from south of 
Mosul, and the Maghamis from Khalis,” also benefited from Hussein’s rule.104  Saddam 
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Hussein is from the Albu Nasir tribe, one of a collection of Arab Sunni tribes called al-
Takarita, the common name for tribes from Tikrit and those who have married into this 
tribal structure.105  Despite the fact that these tribes were the recipients of substantial 
support from the Iraqi government during the last decade, there are divisions in and 
among tribes.  Members of the Albu Nimbr tribe from al-Ramadi were harshly repressed 
in August of 1995 due to protests, and members of the collective Hadithiyyin tribe 
maintain personal grudges against the Hussein regime and collaborators for the execution 
of high-ranking general officers from their tribe.106  Understanding and exploiting these 
divisions would be a useful tool for American policy makers attempting to create a more 
effective tribal counterinsurgency strategy.         
The coalition created its own problems due to its misunderstanding of tribes and 
method for establishing the ISF and local police forces in central Iraq.  Security forces 
were created when coalition planners asked local notables and sheikhs for a given 
number of individuals for training.107  The result of this was the creation of ISF units 
whose members came exclusively from a single Sunni Arab tribe.  Because of this, many 
of Iraq’s ISF units in central Iraq have been largely ineffective, as tribal security 
personnel refrain from not only detaining their tribal kin, but members of other tribes due 
to fear of creating a tribal conflict.108  In the event that tribes do conflict, they possess 
weapons, ammunition and training to fight one another thanks to the coalition security 
forces.  There has been evidence that this has already happened, as coalition forces have 
found marked shell casings from ammunition given to ISF units at the site of ambushed 
ISF personnel.109  Whether the ammunition was given to the insurgents, stolen, or used 
by some ISF members against others, this represents a serious disconnect between 
coalition forces, ISF, and the goals that they are ostensibly trying to accomplish.   
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G.   INDIGENOUS SUNNI ISLAMIST REVIVAL 
One of the most noteworthy trends among the Arab Sunnis is the rise of a Sunni 
Islamist phenomenon increasing in popularity since the beginning of the insurgency.  
This section examines the rise of indigenous Islamism in Iraq prior to and after the fall of 
the Ba’athists as distinctly from notions of holy war supported by Iraq’s transnational 
groups.  This section also shows Iraq’s growing Islamic movement to be a unifying factor 
among the Sunni insurgent groups, and delineates its beliefs, origins, and the reasons for 
its recent renewal. 
Although Iraqi Islamism rose greatly with the insurgency, its roots are deeper.  
The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1948 under the name of the Society for 
the Salvation of Palestine, and the Brotherhood formally established its branch in Iraq by 
1951.110  The organization espoused its beliefs in a democratic government which ruled 
by sharia or religious law, equality for all religions, and economic socialism which 
allowed women the right to work.111  By 1968 however, and the rise of the Ba’ath party, 
Sunni Islamists were crushed alongside Shi’ite Islamists.  For almost thirty years, Sunni 
Islamists were forced to meet and work in secret, limited by a repressive state apparatus.  
In 1991, following the first Gulf War and economic recession, Saddam Hussein changed 
the Ba’ath party’s position regarding the Islamists in an attempt to bolster his domestic 
political support and legitimacy.  In addition the tribes, Hussein courted the Sunni 
Islamists by building mosques, opening Sunni Islamic schools, appointing Islamic 
scholars to parliament, and closing nightclubs.112  By 2003, Hussein’s regime had helped 
foster a new type of indigenous Islamism, which blended with notions of nationalism.         
The rise of Iraqi Islamism was greatly spurred by the beginning of the insurgency 
and the end of many FRL groups.  “The decline of the importance and fortunes of the 
former regime insurgents allowed for the rise to prominence of an Islamo-nationalist 
element within the insurgency which is made up of former military personnel and which 
has received its motivation and encouragement from the preaching of the Sunni 
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clergy.”113  In essence, the failure of certain insurgent groups has created a fusion of 
others, and Sunni clerics within central Iraq have been able to capitalize on this by 
reviving notions of Islamism.  This revival has acted as social glue giving Iraqi Sunni 
nationalists, Ba’athists, and a variety of others common ground on which they can 
cooperate, despite their “deep ideological antipathies.”114  Although some Iraqi Islamist 
insurgent groups exist, the unifying ability of the Islamic revival is what makes this factor 
critical to understanding the Sunni insurgency.  Because of this, the lines and distinctions 
between Sunni insurgent groups have become increasingly blurred, bringing together 
tribal, nationalist, and even criminal elements under this unifying umbrella.     
While Iraqi Islamic revivalists have a variety of opinions on the strictness of 
Islam and the role that it should play in the government, they all hold Islam and the 
establishment of a Sunni-oriented Islamic government to be their central goal.  The main 
difference between the Iraqi Islamists and the jihadists is the formers’ indigenous nature.  
Transnational jihadists derive their ideological tenants elsewhere, whereas Iraqi Islamism 
has been largely home grown and therefore unique.  In addition, most streams of Iraqi 
Islamism are more liberal than the transnational imported strains of Islamism, allowing 
for more compromise between insurgent groups and giving Iraq’s Islamists a wider 
appeal than more extreme Sunni beliefs have found.  Despite this, there has been 
intermingling between imported Islamic fundamentalists and Iraqis, enabling the rise of 
puritanical salafism within post war Iraq.   
 
H.   SUNNI INSURGENT GROUP RELATIONS  
While Sunni FRLs, nationalists, Islamists, and tribal insurgents are separate 
groups, there are linkages between these categories which stem from similar goals or 
politico-familial ties.  These categorizations are by no means static, as the mixed motives 
of many insurgent groups create fluid boundaries between insurgent categories.  There 
have also been indications that Iraq’s Sunni insurgent groups have cooperated with 
transnational elements in the past, when they shared a common purpose or when faced 
with an overwhelming enemy.   
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On 14 November 2003, just six months after the coalition invasion of Iraq,  
General John Abizaid, the head of US Central Command, said there "is some level of 
cooperation (between insurgents) that's taking place at very high levels, although I'm not 
sure I'd say there's a national-level resistance leadership."115  Since that time, 
coordination between Sunni insurgent groups has been increased slightly, especially 
during large operations such as the siege of Fallujah, when insurgent groups had common 
goals and faced a large and concentrated enemy.  Still, deep ideological rifts between 
insurgent groups undermines continuous, large-scale, and serious cooperation, which has 
indeed not yet occurred.116  
Understanding intra and inter-group communication is a daunting task, as most of 
the insurgencies have realized the coalition’s robust communications intercept capability. 
Many insurgent communiqués are passed either verbally or by written notes.  While U.S. 
officials have accused insurgents of using internet resources to coordinate, plan, and 
share tactics, there is more evidence that insurgents have used the media to gather 
information and find out what other cells are doing in order to “produce the maximum 
political and media impact.”117  
 
I.   SIGNIFICANCE 
Iraq’s central provinces remain the coalition’s most difficult challenge as the 
Sunni Arab insurgents in this region continue on a daily basis.  The most significant 
aspect of the Sunni insurgency is its diverse nature.  While the variety of insurgent groups 
has proven to be a nightmare for coalition analysts, it has also been a blessing that has 
prevented effective long-term organized cooperation between insurgencies.  Despite the 
fact that insurgent groups have been known to exchange intelligence, engage in 
cooperative training, and mount a few combined attacks, these episodes have been 
sporadic and typically planned on a case-by-case basis.118  Deep differences between 
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group ideologies have prevented any long-term alliance. Indeed, the groups would most 
likely fight each other if they did not share a common enemy.  Thus, the Sunni 
insurgencies are likely to remain divided, providing coalition forces with an opportunity. 
The diverse nature of these insurgencies holds true for the command, 
communications, and control structure of these groups as well.  While some insurgencies 
are tribal or local, and look to established senior tribal or local leadership for guidance, 
other groups are small, cellular, and have little in the way of a command structure.  The 
extreme flexibility of these groups has left them without a clearly definable center of 
gravity for coalition forces to attack, frustrating operational planners who find themselves 
generally on the defensive.  Understanding the differences between insurgent groups 
could be extremely useful to coalition planners, as not all Sunni insurgent groups have 
the same goals or makeup.  This holds especially true for the tribal insurgents, where 
divisions exist not only between tribes, but within tribal houses as well.  Leveraging these 
differences and exploiting animosities between groups could be a useful tool to coalition 
counterinsurgency planners.    
Operationally, one of the most notable trends with regard to the Sunni insurgents 
has been their improvement in basic anti-coalition capabilities.  Almost two years of 
ongoing fighting between the insurgents, coalition units, and ISF has resulted in a more 
seasoned group of insurgents, more proficient in their armed raids, group tactics, security, 
and IED construction.119  In essence, Iraq’s Sunni insurgency is not disappearing, rather 
its members are getting better at fighting.   
The recent history of Iraq’s Sunnis is also significant.  The revitalization of Iraq’s 
tribal structures and Islamists in order to bolster government legitimacy is central to both 
of these insurgent sub-categories.  Understanding where Iraq’s Arab Sunnis were before 
the war and their privileged position in society is helpful in understanding where they are 
now and their motivations for fighting.  While coalition forces have lost a great deal of 
time and credibility among Iraq’s Arab Sunnis, a recognition of this history can help to 
develop a more flexible counterinsurgency strategy, better suited to dealing with current 
adversaries in Iraq.   
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IV. THE TRANSNATIONALS: OVERVIEW AND CURRENT 
STATUS 
Transnational actors are currently some of the most active insurgent groups in 
Iraq.  Post-war disorder and lack of border control have allowed for the infiltration of 
transnational criminal elements and Islamic jihad-oriented groups who have chosen Iraq 
as the battleground for their causes.  While the Sunni insurgents may be the most 
numerically dominant in Iraq, some transnational groups have received a great deal of 
media attention due to high profile attacks and the sheer brutality of many of their 
operations, such as televised beheadings.  Despite this, there are other transnational 
groups that have been relatively ignored by the international press, such as criminal 
elements, which have been able to capitalize on Iraq’s lack of internal security for profit.     
When considering insurgent groups within Iraq, the transnationalists are by far the 
most diverse.  In comparison with the Sunni and Shi’ite categories, this category holds 
the widest variety of different ethnic, religious, and nationally based groups.  However, 
they all share the common similarity of having a greater interest in their specific group, 
organization, or political agenda, than in the future of the state of Iraq, and accomplish 
this through continuous interactions with support networks that transcend national 
boundaries.  These support networks may be long established, as in the case of the Kurds, 
or they may be relatively new, as in the case of some of Iraq’s jihad-oriented 
transnational insurgents.     
In this chapter, I break down transnational elements into three categories; the 
transnational Islamic jihadists, transnational criminal elements, and Kurds.  Due to the 
overwhelming preponderance of insurgency activity by the jihadists within this typology, 
a significant amount of this chapter will be directed at examining the precise motivations, 
origins, and goals of this group, as well as individual organizations such as al-Qaeda 
affiliates.  Attention will also be paid to criminal elements, transnational and local, which 
have been able to take advantage of the environment of general lawlessness within Iraq, 
being frequently confused with insurgents.  While the large Kurdish enclave in Northern  
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Iraq has been generally willing to work with coalition forces, the size and experience of 
pre-war Kurdish militia forces warrants consideration for the motivations and political 
goals of this community.  
 
A. IRAQ’S POST-WAR POWER VACUUM  
The collapse of the Iraqi government created a power vacuum that had once been 
filled by a repressive state security mechanism.  The Iraqi government had used a variety 
of measures including intimidation and torture in order to keep the country’s multitude of 
resistance groups and criminal elements in check.  Strict internal controls were by no 
means limited to dealing with criminals, Islamic extremists, and rebellious Kurds.  They 
were also used to manage Iraq’s Shi’ite community as well as some anti-regime Sunni 
tribes.  The sudden disappearance of these controls had a significant impact on the 
transnationals, allowing for the rise of new groups, free movement across borders, and 
the reassertion of interests by independent groups which had long been a part of Iraqi 
society.  This section examines the repressive tools and arrangements which Saddam 
Hussein used to police Iraq internally and deal with the country’s transnational groups.  
In this respect, a context is built for understanding group motivations, goals, and their 
current situation.     
“Following its seizure of state control in 1968, the Ba’ath party progressively 
intensified internal political repression and consolidated the functioning of the 
intelligence services as an instrument of domestic pacification against a backdrop of 
armed internal revolts against the Iraqi state by Kurdish and Shi’a groups.”120  This 
consolidation resulted in a robust internal network of intelligence and security 
organizations, which relied heavily upon informants, agents, and operatives to “penetrate 
all layers of Iraqi society.”121  Internal security agencies maintained a long list of 
functions, including protection of the president, prevention of coup attempts, repression 
of domestic dissent, and protection from opposition external to Iraq.122  Saddam Hussein 
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was able to use these organizations to insulate himself and his regime from domestic and 
transnational threats for over 24 years.   
The pervasiveness of Iraqi internal repression has only recently become 
transparent.  Immediately following the cessation of major combat operations, the 
international organization Physicians for Human Rights conducted a population-based 
survey in southern Iraq and found that 47% of households surveyed reported at least one 
human rights abuse.123  For the purpose of the survey, abuses were broadly defined as 
torture, killings, disappearances, forced conscription, gunshot wounds, kidnappings, ear 
amputation, landmine injury, sexual assault, and hostage taking at the hands of the 
government.124  Intimidation and general terrorization of the Iraqi public was the most 
widespread and useful mechanism of Hussein’s regime.  The creation of this environment 
was not only the product of Iraq’s internal security network, but citizens as well, who 
were encouraged to report on each other, and kept in a constant state of fear through 
arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, and killings.125  This campaign was so systematic that 
between three and four million Iraqis comprising approximately 15% of the country’s 
population fled Iraq as opposed to living under Hussein’s Ba’athist regime.126     
The notion of going to an Iraqi prison or detention center for questioning was a 
constant fear under Hussein’s government.  Political dissidents, opponents of the regime, 
and those labeled as criminals were brought to Iraqi prisons and held for indefinite 
periods of time without trial.  Iraqi prisons were some of the worst in the world, where 
prisoners were routinely beaten, raped, and forced into long confinements, frequently in 
small steel boxes or cells that were too small to stand or lay down in.127  Prisoners were 
often underfed to the point of malnutrition and starvation, receiving no medical treatment 
for their injuries.128   
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Torture was another common repression mechanism of the state.  Detainees in 
Iraqi prisons or suspects brought in for questioning could expect a variety of different 
methods including, eye gouging, rape, electric shock, cigarette burns, fingernail pulling, 
beatings, suspension from their limbs, falaqa (beating on the soles of the feet), and 
piercing of the hands with an electric drill.129  Detainees were also subjected to surgical 
amputations of various parts of their bodies, routinely preformed by Iraqi doctors who 
committed them unwillingly, “in an atmosphere of terror.”130  Family members were 
often tortured or executed in front of each other for added humiliation and intentional 
psychological effects.131  Rape of female prisoners became government policy, and 
systematic enough that Iraqi detention centers employed “professional rapists” whose job 
description read “violation of women’s honor.”132  
Kidnappings, disappearances, and executions were also part of Iraq’s repressive 
state apparatus under Saddam Hussein.  These executions were regularly carried out 
without trial, and relatives were often “prevented from burying the victims in accordance 
with Islamic practice, and have even been charged for the bullets used.”133  The nature of 
the kidnappings and executions was frequently random, adding to the general state of 
terror and uncertainty within the Iraqi populace.  At Abu Gharayb prison in 1984 alone, 
approximately 4,000 “political prisoners” were executed.134  Given this location’s 
history, the emotionally charged response of many Iraqis and boost for the insurgency in 
the wake of the mistreatment of detainees while in U.S. custody should have come as no 
surprise to coalition policymakers.  Many of those kidnapped or executed were buried in 
mass graves, and initial estimates completed in August of 2003 by a combined U.S. task 
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force revealed 81 mass grave sites with another possible 30 sites yet to be explored.135  A 
later report by the Coalition Provisional Authority, inclusive of initial surveys, listed over 
260 mass graves in Iraq.136 
While the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime signaled an end to state-sponsored 
abuse for most Iraqis, it also indicated an end to continuous surveillance by government 
security mechanisms and an end to these harsh punishments for transnational groups.  A 
large social void opened where thousands of Iraqi military, intelligence, and security 
personnel had once worked to monitor and suppress unsanctioned activities within Iraq.  
Criminal gangs operating well outside of the purview of the Iraqi state were able to cross 
Iraq’s long borders virtually unchecked.  Transnational jihadists and fundamentalist 
groups which had been not been a part of Iraqi society also took advantage of this 
situation.  Iraq’s Kurdish resistance groups were able to move about and conduct 
operations with far less hindrance from state authority.  The end result was the rise of 
multiple Iraqi transnational insurgent groups, which have frequently become confused 
with previously existing movements within Iraq, such as Kurdish groups, and 
transnational criminal elements.     
 
B. THE KURDS 
Accounting for approximately 15% of Iraq’s population, the Kurds have been a 
historically repressed community.137  Many of the same mechanisms which had been 
used to repress the Shi’ites were directed against Iraqi Kurds to prevent this enclave from 
posing a threat to the Ba’athist regime.  In response to this persecution, Iraq’s Kurds 
established several large resistance movements, with their own goals, political agendas, 
and paramilitary sections.  These groups have played a significant role in Iraq’s internal 
security situation over the past several decades, maintaining large and active militias.  
While Iraq’s Kurdish community has, thus far, refrained from promoting any active 
insurgent groups and seems to be supportive of the Iraqi government and its moves 
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toward democracy, these militias and their potential cannot be discounted.  With the end 
of the recent Iraq war, the militias remained, and while their disarmament has begun, the 
historical repression of Iraq’s Kurdish community must be considered, as well as the 
groups which arose to defend it.   
Categorization of the Kurds as a transnational group is based on several different 
factors.  The general dispersion of the Kurds across eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, and 
western Iran created long-standing pre-war connections and smuggling routes which still 
exist today.  In addition to this, the Kurds have “demonstrated time and time again that 
they are interested in greater self government in the north, not leadership of a government 
in Baghdad.”138  While current realities within Iraq such as the presence of coalition 
forces, opportunity for democracy, and disarmament of Peshmerga (militia) forces have 
made the pursuit of an independent Kurdish State unlikely, the Kurds may attempt to 
form an independent unit within the new state of Iraq.  Beyond a historical record of 
autonomous aspirations, the Kurds have actual experience with “self-rule, civil rights, 
and a transition to democracy,” which was exercised largely in northern Iraq under the 
protection of the U.N. mandated no-fly-zone in the decade prior to the recent Iraq war.139   
The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group with their own language in the rough area 
approximately 230,000 square miles in size.  The fall of the Ottoman Empire following 
World War I saw the failure of the Kurds to achieve international recognition and secure 
their own state which they had been promised under the 1920 terms of the Treaty of 
Sevres.  In the decades that followed, Iraqi nationalism prompted periods of 
“Arabization” where the government forcibly moved up to 250,000 non-Arabs (mostly 
Kurds), in order to strengthen a Sunni Arab hold on Iraq’s most fertile and resource-rich 
lands.140  Government policies directed at the Kurds intensified after the Iran-Iraq War, 
and between 1987 and 1988, Saddam Hussein ordered a series of eight military moves 
against the Kurds known as anfal (spoils of war) campaigns.  These campaigns were in 
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retaliation for frequent Kurdish uprisings and overt Kurdish support for Iranian forces 
during the Iran-Iraq War.  During this time, it is estimated that over 300,000 Kurds were 
killed and approximately 4,000 villages were destroyed.141  In 1988, two separate events 
drew attention of the international community as Iraqi military units killed thousands of 
Kurds with poison gas in the village of Halabja during what is thought to be a retaliatory 
strike against Peshmerga forces, and in Iraq’s Badinan mountain area where Kurdish 
refugees had been attempting to flee to Turkey.142  The Kurds were harshly repressed 
once again after the first Gulf War, when Republican Guard units which had been spared 
from coalition attacks turned north and put down a Kurdish rebellion, razing villages and 
killing thousands more.   
While ethnic tensions do exist in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, especially 
between Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen, it appears that these groups have set aside their 
differences in order to participate in Iraq’s new political process.  Nevertheless Kurdish 
paramilitary forces are some of Iraq’s largest, most experienced, and most well armed.  
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talibani and Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barazani are Iraq’s two largest Kurdish paramilitary groups.  
They are frequently referred to as the Talibani and Barazani factions, as both groups are 
principally extension of these two large Kurdish tribes.  These groups have frequently 
been at odds with each other, and over the course of the past several decades, intra-group 
fighting has been common.  Combined, the KDP and PUK fielded an estimated 75,000 
fighters at the end of the Iraq war, but recent overtures by the Iraqi government have 
moved these groups toward disarmament and integration into the new Iraqi army and 
ISF.143   
Given the history of Iraq’s government-sponsored repression of the Kurds, “it is 
imperative that any future structure of governance institutionalizes protections and 
guarantees for all of Iraq’s communities, but most notably the Kurds who have been so 
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brutally victimized on the basis of cultural identity.”144  This legacy has given the 
Kurdish community a vested interest in guaranteeing a safe future for its population, and 
despite the current compliance of their paramilitary forces, this could change if the Kurds 
felt that they were not being properly represented or given a fair stake in the future of 
Iraq.    
 
C.   CRIMINAL ELEMENTS 
Organized criminal elements are probably the least understood and least discussed 
facet of Iraq’s post-war turmoil.  They have been responsible for smuggling, bribery, the 
movement of people, armed attacks, kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation 
campaigns.  Because of this, criminal activity has become frequently confused with Iraq’s 
insurgent groups.  While local criminal elements are a factor, it is the transnational 
elements which maintain the connections, weapons, money and networks that pose the 
greatest threat to peace and stability within Iraq.  Well-armed and informed by a myriad 
of insiders within Iraq’s government and security services, these groups are primarily 
motivated by money, and frequently sell their services to the highest bidder, regardless of 
political or ideological orientation.  Since the end of major combat operations, these 
organizations have evolved into large and well-organized criminal groups, with “ties to 
each other and resourceful outsiders.”145  This phenomenon has provided transnational 
criminal organizations operating within Iraq tremendous resources and capabilities both 
internal to and beyond the country’s borders.   
The result of the growing organized crime problem within Iraq has been an 
increasing crime rate, which has a daily impact on the quality of life of Iraqis.  In a 
survey last year, Iraq’s Center for Research and Strategic Studies found that 60% of 
Iraqis felt “not very safe” or “not safe at all” in their neighborhoods, and similar 
percentages reflected that they had “not very” much or “no” confidence in coalition 
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forces to improve their security conditions.146  A separate survey suggested that 59% of 
Iraqis designate security as their major concern, and 40% of those respondents had 
singled out street crime, as opposed to terrorism and political violence, as their main 
source of concern.147  Iraq’s lack of efficient internal security, and the coalition’s general 
unwillingness to combat identified “criminal” activity has not helped this situation.148  In 
another poll last year, 67% of Iraqis sampled felt that coalition forces did not try at all to 
prevent Iraqi citizens from being killed or wounded, and 18% of those surveyed felt that 
coalition forces “tried only a little” to protect Iraqis.149  The soaring crime rate is also 
significant as it provides a challenge to coalition forces, eroding their legitimacy and 
building popular resentment for their preoccupation with coalition security and seeming 
lack of concern for the general welfare of Iraq’s citizenry.150    
Theft and smuggling have been some of transnational criminal organizations’ 
largest enterprises, with networks stealing building materials, and destroying existing 
infrastructure to sell for profit.  These smuggling networks are sophisticated, and many 
are a product of the Iraqi government’s pre-war mechanisms to subvert sanctions by 
moving materials through neighboring countries.151  In a November 2004 report, U.S. 
congressional investigators stated that Hussein’s regime had made more than 21.3 billion 
dollars by circumventing U.N. mandated sanctions, seven billion of which came from 
subversion of the oil-for-food program, and over thirteen billion from other smuggling 
activities.152  While some of the oil was smuggled out of Iraq’s southern port of Umm 
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Qasr, the majority of it was trucked overland to Jordan and pumped through the Kirkuk-
Banian pipeline into Syria.153  In addition, weapons, equipment, and spare parts were 
readily available through smuggling networks in Jordan and Syria.  Prior to the war, Iraqi 
defectors validated this, specifying that Iraq received a variety of military equipment such 
as anti-aircraft missiles, rocket guidance systems, tank engines, and fighter aircraft parts 
via overland routes from Syria.154  In order to make this transnational mechanism of 
financial and logistical connections work, Iraq’s pre-war smuggling network was 
expansive, operating at all levels of the government and the commercial sector.  After the 
war, the smuggling networks remained largely intact, maintaining their cross-border 
connections and benefiting from the wide variety of insurgent groups, which required 
logistical support. Although these activities may seem low-level in comparison with 
armed attacks, they do a great deal to undermine the credibility of the coalition and 
reconstruction efforts, and are symbolic of the lack of effective control that security 
forces and the coalition maintain over Iraq’s internal security.   
Kidnapping is another lucrative enterprise for insurgents, bringing them money, 
sending political messages, and in some cases, effecting policy.  Senior figures within 
Iraq’s Interior Ministry believe that insurgents have begun working with criminal 
organizations, “outsourcing” kidnappings to criminal groups, thereby allowing them to 
seize a specific demographic of captive when they have the opportunity and then sell the 
captive to the insurgent group.155  It is believed that Jack Hensley and Eugene 
Armstrong, two American contractors seized from their Baghdad residence in September 
and beheaded by radical insurgents, were the targets of such an arrangement.156  In other 
incidents, the kidnapping of a Filipino truck driver in July of 2004 and the threat of his 
execution prompted the Philippines to change national policy by withdrawing its small 
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contingent of troops from Iraq in a highly publicized event, winning the insurgent 
kidnappers legitimacy.  In January of 2005, the Governor of Iraq’s Anbar Province, one 
of the most violent areas of the country, was forced to resign after his three sons were 
kidnapped by insurgents or criminal gangs.  Beyond the economic motivations of 
criminal organizations involved in kidnappings, are the implications of this network for 
inter-insurgent group cooperation.  With a great deal of money at stake, it is probable that 
kidnappings and the trade of captives could provide yet another link between insurgent 
groups with different motivations and ideological bases.           
 
D. TRANSNATIONAL JIHADISTS 
There have been a wide variety of transnational jihad groups that have taken part 
in the Iraqi insurgency, some larger than others.  Because of their religious nature, 
transnational jihad groups have had a wide-ranging appeal, attracting fighters from all 
over the Muslim world.  This has resulted in a multitude of groups, comprised of 
indigenous Iraqis and foreigners with financial and logistical lines, which reach well 
beyond Iraq’s national borders.  Al Zawra, an Iraqi newspaper, identified several of these 
groups last fall, including Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunnah, Tawhid wal-Jihad, the 
Islamic Army in Iraq, and various others.157    
Despite this variety, these groups all share the common similarity of basing their 
resistance upon a specific radical interpretation of Islam.  This reading of the religion 
goes beyond traditional orthodoxy by demanding a role for Islam in government, and 
more broadly speaking, labeling all of those who do not adhere to this interpretation of 
Islam as enemies, which must be subdued by using violence if necessary.158  In a taped 
recording made public on 30 January 2005, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Osama bin-Laden’s 
chief deputy, described the “three foundations” of Al Qaeda’s ideology: a “Quran-based 
authority to govern,” which condemns secularism and calls for an Islamic state under 
sharia law; “liberation of the homelands,” which demands the expulsion of Americans 
and other foreigners from the Middle East, who have sought to control their energy 
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resources and manipulate a “pro-Israeli conspiracy in the region;” and the eventual 
“liberations of all human beings” who would overthrow their corrupt governments in 
favor of pure Islamic law and governance.159 
There are multiple known linkages between Iraq’s transnational jihadist groups 
and al-Qaeda, but the most telling evidence comes from direct statements made by 
insurgent leader Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi (born Fazel Inzal al-Khalayleh), and Osama 
bin-Laden.  On 17 October 2004, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi issued an online statement 
known as a bay’ah (oath of allegience), to Osama bin-Laden.160  This statement was 
found to be authentic by U.S. intelligence analysts and was furthermore endorsed by bin-
Laden and al-Zawahiri.161  Given al-Zarqawi’s media attention and successful operations 
at the time, the rationale behind this pledge is unclear.  A variety of motivations have 
been proposed, but it is believed that coalition operations in Fallujah had degraded al-
Zarqawi’s base of support and he was forced to ask al-Qaeda for further assistance.162  
This theory is largely based on the supposition that “groups like al-Zarqawi’s would 
prefer to retain their independence and autonomy to enhance their maneuverability and 
ability to attract recruits and funding.”163       
When considering specific transnational jihadist groups in the Iraqi insurgency, 
Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) has become prototypical.  While this group is 
largely of Kurdish origin, its motivations classify it as a transnational jihadist group as 
opposed to a Kurdish insurgent group.  Ansar al-Islam is believed to be the result of a 
merger between several northern Iraqi Islamist factions and Jund al-Islam, a radical 
Islamist group lead by Abu Abdallah al-Shafi’i.164  Ansar al-Islam predates most of 
Iraq’s other jihadist groups as it was established in August of 2001 in the remote 
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mountainous area between northern Iran and Iraq.165  The group is believed to have been 
established with $300,000 to $600,000 in financing from al-Qaeda, and fell under the 
influence of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi when he fled Jordan in December of 2001 and 
sought refuge with the group.166  Upon its inception, Ansar al-Islam benefited greatly 
from the pre-existing connections that had been established by Jund al-Islam and other 
radical groups.  In addition to personal connections, Jund al-Islam reportedly brought a 
large arsenal of weapons into Iraq, including Katyusha rockets, artillery shells, anti-tank 
and anti-air guns, sniper rifles, rocket propelled grenades, machine guns and mortars.167   
In comparison with Iraq’s other insurgent groups, foreign fighters make up only a 
small percentage of the total number of insurgents, numbering fewer than 1,000 in 
official U.S. government estimates.168  The support networks for these fighters are 
believed to be largely external to Iraq, with these groups receiving weapons, funding, and 
personnel from not only neighboring countries, but individuals and organizations as well.  
The U.S. administration has gone to great lengths to prevent this support, accusing Iran 
and Syria of directly assisting Iraq’s insurgents.  While this is speculative, and “neither 
country could overtly support the insurgency, it is not too far-fetched to assume they did 
so covertly, or turned a blind eye to pro-insurgent activities within their respective 
countries.”169  The disappearance of border controls between Iraq and its neighbors after 
the war certainly did not help this situation, and as previously mentioned, it is likely that 
transnational criminal organizations and those pre-war networks established to subvert 
sanctions have made a lucrative business in helping many of Iraq’s transnational 
insurgent groups receive support.         
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Regardless of their small numbers, transnational jihad groups such as Ansar al-
Islam have been the center of media attention in Iraq due to their linkages with Al- 
Qaeda, large-scale attacks, and executions of captured foreign workers.  Ansar al-Islam 
took credit for the UN headquarters and Jordanian Embassy bombings carried out in 
August of 2003.   It is also believed that al-Zarqawi was personally responsible for the 
beheading of captured American Nicholas Berg in May of 2004, and his affiliated groups 
were responsible for ten similar subsequent executions.170  These attacks have come to be 
part of what is thought to be al-Zarqawi’s strategy in Iraq, aimed at “pressuring 
international actors to rescind their support for Iraq’s American-led transition,” deterring 
Iraqis from supporting the transition through attacks on Iraqi government and security 
personnel, obstructing reconstruction efforts through creating an environment of terror, 
and promoting a rift between Iraq’s sectarian communities trough the indiscriminate 
killing of Shi’ites and attacks on Shi’ite holy sites.171   
The media has become a critical part of transnational jihadists operations, 
providing them with feedback on their attacks, and allowing groups to disseminate their 
messages.  In many respects, terrorism and the media have a mutually beneficial 
relationship, where jihadist activities provide media companies with “high profile, 
ratings-building events,” and simultaneously allow jihadist groups instant access to a 
large audience.172  Many of these events, such as videotaped executions, are designed by 
jihadists with a specified target audience in mind, attempting to influence foreign 
laborers, Iraqi citizens working with the coalition, or foreign troops.173  Media coverage 
of armed attacks, bombings, and other tactical events is another dimension of this 
problem, providing groups with an instant assessment of the effectiveness of their 
operation.  This provides coalition military members and Iraqi government officials with 
yet another set of hurdles, as insurgent groups, especially transnational jihadists, have 
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been able to use the media for not only “bomb damage assessment,” but to gauge the 
overall psychological impact of an attack or televised execution on their target audience.   
Due to the multitude of different groups, complex financing, and likely crossover 
of fighters, it is difficult to disaggregate many of Iraq’s individual jihadist groups.  Some 
have speculated that many of Iraq’s transnational jihadists groups are actually the same 
group of individuals, who have used multiple group names at different times to confuse 
the coalition and make their numbers seem greater than they truly are.174  When 
considering specific group relations, Ansar al-Islam is believed to have close linkages 
with other radical Islamist insurgent groups in Iraq, such as Ansar al-Sunnah and Tawhid 
wal-Jihad.  It is rumored that Ansar al-Sunnah is actually the evolution of Ansar al-
Islam, which took place in late 2003 under the direction of Abu Abdallah al-Shafi’i.175  
The linkage between Ansar al-Islam and Tawhid wal-Jihad stems from the fact that 
Tawhid wal-Jihad was the name of al-Zarqawi’s group established in late 2000 through 
direct cooperation with Osama bin-Laden.176  While the founding of this group also 
predates the Iraq war by two and a half years, and its operations were largely aimed at 
overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy, it is believed that many of Tawhid’s connections 
and overland smuggling routes through Iran are still used in supporting Iraq’s 
transnational jihadists.177          
Prewar connections, which tie Jund al-Islam and Ansar al-Islam to the Iraqi 
government, have also been proposed and provide a potential current connection between 
insurgent groups.  It is believed by some that Iraqi intelligence agents supplied Ansar al-
Islam with money, weapons, and free reign to operate in northern Iraq, prior to the 
coalition invasion.178  The motivation behind this move is thought to have come from a 
mutual dislike of Kurdish resistance groups, which Ansar al-Islam targeted based on their 
“relatively secular and democratic” tendencies.179  The resulting campaign against 
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Kurdish resistance groups began an internal war in northern Iraq, which first made 
international news in September of 2001 when 43 PUK fighters were killed and mutilated 
in an ambush by Ansar al-Islam fighters.180  Until the invasion of Iraq, a variety of other 
attacks ensued, including bombings and targeted assassinations.  Given their focus on 
Kurdish groups, it is possible that Saddam Hussein at least passively supported Ansar al-
Islam, as his regime undoubtedly profited from these activities that kept Kurdish groups 
at bay in the north, as opposed to threatening the regime.181  While little is known about 
the relationship between this jihadist group and other Sunni insurgent groups, one can 
speculate that prewar connections between Ba’athists and jihadists did not wholly 
disappear once the regime fell, providing yet another possibility for insurgent group 
cooperation and communication.  Ideologically, associations between Ba’athists and 
Islamic fundamentalists run counter to the central secular tenants of Ba’athism.  
Realistically however, the potential pre-war connections between Ba’athists and jihadists, 
as well as pre-war transnational criminal and smuggling networks, provides a useful 
forum for group cooperation.  As mentioned earlier, these connections were likely 
deepened by the capture of Saddam Hussein and many of the regime’s former officials, 
as the ideological beliefs of Ba’athism became less important to many FRLs, making way 
for the realistic tactical and logistical difficulties of fighting the coalition.              
Despite the possibility for transnational jihadist cooperation with other insurgent 
groups, it is likely that their extremist beliefs and methods will continue to set them apart 
from other insurgent groups, and make the prospect of long-term cooperation between 
these groups unlikely.  Indications of this division were seen in the city of Fallujah during 
the summer of 2004, when insurgent groups were preparing for the coalition’s assault on 
the city, and forced to operate in close quarters with each other.  There are reports that 
tensions almost resulted in intra-group conflict between a transnational jihadist group and 
an Iraqi nationalist group during the summer of 2004, which was eventually settled by a 
handful of insurgent group leaders who convinced the jihadists to leave Fallujah’s Jolan 
suburb.182   
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These tensions have ideological and doctrinal roots, and while many Sunni 
insurgents may admire the training, motivation, and skills which the jihadists possess, 
many mainstream Islamists and tribal fighters “resent (their) ideological agenda which 
has resulted in the killing of Iraqis, simply for not adhering to a strict religious line.”183  
Jihadists have justified these killings of Iraqi Muslims “by branding (them) as kafirs 
(unbelievers) for aiding in the reconstruction of Iraq, under infidel occupation.”184  
Despite this justification, there remains a deep rift between jihadists and other Sunni 
insurgents.  Other insurgent groups have found fault with Zarqawi’s methods, 
realistically citing the fact that his brutal tactics have detracted from international 
sympathy for their plight.185  This complaint was especially valid in the case of Nicholas 
Berg, who was executed following the Abu Gharayb scandal, bringing broad 
international criticism and shifting media attention from the prison to the insurgency.  
Iraq’s influential Sunni clerical organization, the Association of Muslim Scholars, has 
also repeatedly condemned the al-Zarqawi network for beheading foreigners, stating that 
this violates Islamic law, further showing divisions, even among Islamists.186    
 
E. SIGNIFICANCE    
Iraq’s diverse transnational groups present coalition policymakers with an array of 
options and challenges.  The multitude of dissimilar groups certainly poses a difficult task 
for coalition analysts and forces, but it is also representative of the sheer differences 
between groups.  While cooperation between insurgent groups does exist, tension 
between many Sunni insurgent groups and transnational jihadists bodes well for the 
coalition.  Properly addressed by Iraqi government and coalition policy, these clear 
divisions amongst groups may be exploitable.   
Beyond this, the significance of transnational crime and its effect on Iraq’s 
citizenry is also of critical importance to coalition legitimacy in Iraq.  Currently, Iraqi 
fears seem to be far more focused on crime such as kidnapping, murder, and assault, than 
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on insurgent-driven violence.  Iraqi beliefs that coalition forces are more concerned with 
force protection and hunting down active insurgents are validated every time coalition 
forces pursue insurgent forces instead of protecting Iraqi citizens.  The lack of attention 
by coalition forces to criminal problems will only marginalize coalition forces even 
further, as well as their efforts in reconstruction.  
In Iraq’s post-war environment, criminal elements seem to have flourished, and 
their continued consolidation and organization is worrisome.  The economically-driven 
nature of transnational insurgents also makes them an ally of any group which can pay 
for their services, presenting another difficult problem for coalition forces.  Specifically, 
the “kidnapping for hire” scheme being employed by transnational criminal groups is a 
symptom of this evolution and will likely provide coalition forces and Iraqi security 
personnel with a difficult alliance to combat in the future.  Because of Iraq’s ongoing 
insurgent activities, whether criminally driven or not, NGO’s, reconstruction efforts, and 
investors have remained limited in high-crime areas of Iraq.  This scenario is proving to 
be a vicious cycle, as reconstruction efforts and an improved quality of life will likely 
increase coalition legitimacy and work to stem insurgent activities.   
In many ways, comparisons can be drawn with the fifteen year-long Lebanese 
civil war, during which time reconstruction efforts were severely hampered by ongoing 
violence, corruption, and crime.  After several years, the Lebanese situation became a 
war without a victor, where many of the participants benefited from the conflict because 
of external support, money, and other incentives.  Criminal activity was rife and became 
mixed thoroughly with militia and faction activity.  The potential evolution of Iraq’s 
security environment into a similar situation, especially in the central provinces, is a 
possibility that coalition planners should not discount.   
While coalition forces need not resort to the inhumane measures used by Saddam 
Hussein, they may need to rethink their counterinsurgency strategy within Iraq, and 
concentrate more on providing security for the Iraqi people over other priorities.   
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The basis of any insurgency is clearly the population from which it rises.  While 
U.S. strategists have identified this in theory by stating that we must win the “hearts and 
minds” of the Iraqi people, the root of Iraq’s insurgency has not been addressed in 
practice.  Coalition policy remains targeted on “killing active insurgents rather than 
identifying and rectifying the structural problems that spawned them.”187  These 
structural problems arise from the myriad of historical, political, and social factors 
previously examined, and have produced a wide variety of insurgent groups.   
Faced with ongoing daily violence and the prospect of a long-term 
counterinsurgency campaign within Iraq, coalition military planners need a better 
understanding of Iraq’s diverse insurgency and new ideas on how to handle this problem.  
By breaking the insurgency down into Shi’ite, Sunni, and transnational categories, I have 
demonstrated that the Iraqi insurgency can be disaggregated into groups with their own 
specific goals, historical motivations, and tendencies.  Differences amongst insurgent 
groups within categories have also been discussed, highlighting the fact that the Iraqi 
insurgency is far from monolithic, but rather a variety of concurrent movements, often at 
odds with each other.  In this way, I reiterate the necessity for disaggregating the Iraqi 
insurgency into typologies, and the importance of a better understanding of the 
motivations, origins, and goals of insurgent groups within each typology.  Based on this 
understanding, policy makers are better equipped to fabricate a flexible 
counterinsurgency strategy that will account for differences not only between categories, 
but within them as well.  
With respect to insurgent typologies, I have shown the Shi’ites to be a unique 
category of insurgents, motivated by their own distinct set of goals.  These goals are 
largely rooted in history, and their status as a repressed majority has had a tremendous 
impact on the rise, motivations, and ideology of the Shi’ite insurgents.  While this 
insurgency was principally composed of the Mahdi Army, I have shown this group to 
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represent only a small number of Iraqis, as the interests of the Shi’ite community are far 
from homogenous.  Iraqi Shi’ites have a wide range of opinions with regard to the 
political, and social future of Iraq and its Shi’ite community.  This diversity is not a new 
phenomenon and is even present within Iraq’s Shi’ite ulama.  Understanding the 
historical factors behind the rise of the Shi’ite insurgency, as well as the divisions within 
this community are crucial in not only working with Iraqi Shi’ites, but preventing the rise 
of another Shi’ite insurgency.       
Iraqi Sunni insurgents are another distinct category.  I have demonstrated that this 
community’s privileged status during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and loss of status after the 
coalition invasion, is just one motivating factor underpinning Iraq’s Sunni insurgency.  I 
also clearly divided this typology into subcategories, namely FRLs, nationalists, tribal 
insurgents, and indigenous Sunni Islamists.  While many of the Ba’athists have been 
captured, killed, or shifted to different groups, this group of FRLs remains a potential 
financier of other insurgents.  Iraqi nationalists remain one of the largest subcategories of 
insurgents, motivated by their desire to expel foreign forces and prevent power from 
falling into the hands of the Shi’ites.  Traditional power structures and tribal networks 
have also played a large part amongst Sunni insurgents, and this aspect of the insurgency 
remains one of the coalition’s most challenging hurdles in their efforts towards stability.  
And finally, the revival of indigenous Sunni Islamism has functioned as a cohesive 
element between insurgent groups, helping to bring together insurgents, especially during 
times of increased coalition pressure.  
The power vacuum resulting from the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime was 
the impetus behind the rise of the final category of insurgents, the transnationals.  The 
repressive state security mechanism of the old government was replaced by an 
environment of lawlessness in which insurgents have flourished.  I have shown that the 
transnationals can be divided into three different subcategories, Kurds, jihadists, and 
criminal elements.  While the Kurds have not sponsored an active insurgent group, their 
large and well-equipped Peshmerga forces are Iraq’s largest militias, and therefore, the 
motivations and goals of this community must be considered in coalition interaction with 
this community.  Transnational jihadists have been some of Iraq’s most active groups, 
receiving a great deal of attention for their high profile and graphic attacks.  
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Transnational criminal groups, who have capitalized on pre-war smuggling networks, 
have been some of the Iraq’s most overlooked insurgents.  Groups within this sub-
category have been responsible for many of Iraq’s kidnappings, and the highly organized, 
financially motivated nature of these insurgents has made them the willing accomplice of 
any group within Iraq that can afford their services.  Despite this, coalition forces still 
benefit from the sheer number of varied groups within Iraq, as the high degree of 
diversity amongst insurgent groups has, thus far, undermined their long-term cooperation 
and coordination.    
   
A. COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this section is to propose a general set of counterinsurgency 
policy-oriented recommendations aimed at more effectively addressing many of the root 
causes of the insurgency.  These recommendations are derived from a more profound 
understanding of Iraq’s disaggregated insurgency, and the various tendencies of the 
individual groups within.    
1.  Concentrate on Crime 
Possibly one of the greatest challenges to achieving long-term stability stems 
from the pervasive nature of crime and transnational criminal elements which have 
hampered reconstruction efforts, given aid to insurgent groups, and contributed to the 
general atmosphere of lawlessness in Iraq.  Post-war conditions, neglect, and corruption 
have already contributed to the growing problem of organized crime.  The embryonic 
Iraqi police forces have been either too overwhelmed with insurgent attacks or too 
heavily infiltrated with collaborators in order to effectively deal with the growth in crime.  
Thus far, U.S. policy makers have directed the coalition’s counterinsurgency strategy on 
insurgent fighters, such as Sunni nationalist, jihadi, or Sunni tribal groups.188  Little 
attention has been paid to the growing criminal threat, which provides many of these 
groups the logistical support and assistance that they need to survive.  Iraqi citizens see 
this, and the perceived lack of consideration for their safety and security works against 
coalition credibility.  As previously mentioned, organized crime-sponsored kidnappings 
have evolved into a business within Iraq, providing insurgent groups and criminal 
                                                 
188  Steven Metz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 34.   
74 
elements with a mutually beneficial arrangement that can be likened to South American 
insurgencies, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC).  The 
unchecked nature of crime in Iraq has become a problem that can no longer be ignored, 
and “should this continue at such a rapid rate, bringing it under control will take 
decades.”189   
Identifying and targeting transnational criminal elements is critical to a more 
effective counterinsurgency strategy.  Ongoing crime and violence takes a daily toll on 
coalition credibility and legitimacy.  Iraqi citizens who fall victim to a bombing, 
shooting, or kidnapping are less likely to care about the political or economic motivations 
behind the crime than the actual crime itself.  The primary message remains that the new 
Iraqi government and the coalition lack the strength to protect the average Iraqi citizen.  
In this respect, U.S. policymakers need to reorient their counterinsurgency strategy, 
taking crime more seriously and implementing measures which undercut the criminal 
base in Iraq, thus severing its relationship with insurgent groups. 
Tougher anti-crime policies should be implemented at the local level, with an 
emphasis on stronger and more effective local police forces which can provide the 
environment of security that Iraqi reconstruction efforts and civilians need.  While the use 
of coalition or foreign forces to police crime in Iraqi cities is impractical due to barriers 
of credibility, language, and cultural knowledge, there are many things that coalition 
forces can do in order to assist Iraqis in this task.  More thorough vetting of government 
employees, oversight, increased financing, and increased training are just a few areas 
where coalition forces can assist without directly engaging in policing actions.  
Specifically, Iraqi forces need to become better at fighting criminal and insurgent forces.  
Whereas American soldiers winning a major victory over insurgents or cracking down on 
crime does little for Iraqi perceptions on the credibility and strength of the new 
government, ISF and police victories go much further in building a positive perception.  
“The key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, 
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but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping 
local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.”190 
Increased border patrols, surveillance, and focused intelligence resources are 
other areas that the coalition could help with.  Iraq’s poorly regulated borders are 
especially of concern, as the new border guard is severely limited in its ability to police 
the lengthy, open borders.191  Coalition troops could certainly facilitate these operations, 
limiting the transnational flow of illicit goods and persons that help feed the insurgency.  
The creation of a secure environment in Iraq will continue to be an elusive goal until Iraqi 
and coalition forces are able to sever many of the transnational links which provide Iraqi 
insurgents with logistical aid and services.     
2. Re-Empower Iraq’s Sunni Arab Sheikhs       
Understanding the history of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and their preferential treatment 
under Saddam Hussein’s regime is crucial to grasping their current sense of frustration 
and fears with regard to their uncertain future.  Previous power structures and networks 
were disenfranchised after the coalition invasion, leaving many Sunni Arabs with the 
notion that they had few alternatives other than resistance.  Saddam Hussein realized the 
value of these structures, and was able to use them to legitimize his regime when he most 
needed the political support.  Sunni Arab fears of political alienation and social 
penetration by the new Iraqi government are at the center of this, especially among 
tribally-oriented Sunnis.   
Coalition policymakers and Iraqi officials should consider plans to re-empower 
tribal sheiks, and make conciliatory moves towards giving Sunni tribal areas specific 
allowances that would contribute to their sense of autonomy and self-protection.  While 
this would not completely solve the Sunni insurgency, it would help to assuage the fears 
of many Sunni Arabs and help to defuse conspiratorial rhetoric.  Offers could include 
giving tribal areas some room to administer tribal law, while still guaranteeing basic 
human rights under Iraqi national law.  The notion of “deputizing” tribal sheikhs or 
families to oversee reconstruction projects in their locale could be another method of 
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winning local support and helping to insure the security of infrastructure.192  Incentives 
such as contracts, equipment, and investment opportunities could accompany these deals, 
and help to further bolster local support.   
Currently, Iraqi government officials and coalition policymakers are faced with 
stubborn resistance groups in central Iraq that seem to believe that they have few 
alternatives other than insurgency.  Giving these groups a stake in the future of Iraq by 
utilizing existing power structures, the prospect of authority, and economic development 
could help end the insurgent activity in central Iraq.  In the long-term, coalition and 
“outsider” forces in Sunni tribal areas will continue to be perceived as enemies, and 
cooperation with Iraq’s tribal networks may be our only solution for lasting peace in 
these areas.   
3. Capitalize on Existing Intra-Group Tensions 
The highly decentralized and diverse nature of the Iraqi insurgency is another 
factor, which coalition policymakers can use to their advantage.  Fractured relationships 
between and within insurgent typologies provide U.S. and Iraqi officials with 
opportunities to exploit these differences and capitalize on many already existing 
tensions.  The near-violent incidents between local insurgents and transnational 
insurgents prior to the Fallujah campaign are an excellent example of this rift.  Tensions 
between Sunni tribal groups can also be used in the same way, as many of Iraq’s tribes 
and families maintain long-standing animosities which predate the coalition invasion. 
Strategists and intelligence collection assets need to take advantage of these points of 
contention, using them as leverage to recruit sources, gather information, and exploit the 
weaknesses of insurgent groups at odds with each other.   
4. Be Willing to Negotiate  
Since the onset of the insurgency, coalition officials have been consistently 
reluctant to negotiate with any insurgent groups.  While some insurgent groups, such as 
transnational jihadists, do not have ties to or a stake in the future of Iraq, other insurgent 
groups do.  This realization should have effects on coalition counterinsurgency strategy, 
and make the prospect of negotiating with certain insurgent groups far more agreeable to 
coalition and Iraqi government officials.  Understanding which groups hold a stake in the 
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future of Iraq should also have an impact on coalition tactics, as the killing of local tribal 
insurgents will likely have community-oriented effects that the killing of transnational 
jihadists or criminal elements may not.  It is in this respect that coalition policy makers 
should be more willing to negotiate with groups such as Sunni tribal or nationalist 
insurgents, noting the fact that these are indigenously Iraqi groups, which have roots and 
a future in Iraq.  It is with regard to these groups that coalition counterinsurgency strategy 
should be the most population-focused, addressing the structural and historical causes of 
the insurgency within the Sunni Arab population, rather than hunting insurgents.  With a 
substantial population base, these groups of insurgents will be able to replenish their 
numbers, serving only to deepen long-term animosities between this population and 
coalition forces without resolving the conflict. 
Coalition policymakers also must work to instill this willingness within Iraq’s 
ethnic and religious communities.  “The United States must make it clear to Iraqi 
community leaders that it is their responsibility to reach compromise with responsible 
leaders of other ethnic or sectarian communities because the United States cannot remain 
in Iraq indefinitely, nor can it adjudicate Iraqi factional disputes indefinitely.”193  This 
will be perhaps one of the most difficult tasks in post-war Iraq, as highly emotional 
tensions exist between many of these communities, underscoring mutual mistrust and 
resentments.  Regardless, social groups and politicians do not necessarily need to trust 
each other in order to effectively work within a government, but they do need to trust the 
system.  Perhaps this is a more attainable goal on which coalition officials can focus their 
efforts in hopes of building a stable Iraq.   
5. Continue to Work with Cooperative Parties 
Finally, it is essential that coalition officials recognize the efforts made by 
Kurdish and Shi’ite community leaders who have worked with the coalition and urged 
patience and restraint in the face of insurgent violence.  Sunni Arab and transnational 
insurgents continue to target these two communities with assassinations and bombings in 
an attempt to provoke retaliation, and prompt large-scale inter-communal violence.  
Shi’ite mosques and gatherings have been particularly targeted, leaving dozens of 
                                                 
193  W. Andrew Terrill, “Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq,” Strategic Studies 
Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute publications, February 2005), 
39. 
78 
civilians killed and wounded since the end of the January 2005 elections.  Thus far, 
Shi’ite and Kurdish community leaders such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Jalal 
Talabani have advocated cooperation with the coalition, and pressed for their 
communities to work within Iraq’s new government.  Much of this complicity has been 
based on the hope that the Shi’ites and the Kurds will have a better future in a democratic 
Iraq than they have had in the past.  While this cooperation is promising, coalition 
policymakers should continue to respect the contributions of these community leaders, 
maintaining open channels for communication, taking their concerns seriously, and 
refraining from taking this cooperation for granted.  Both of these communities have the 
potential to support large and homogenous insurgencies, and without their willing 
support, political, economic, and social reconstruction efforts in Iraq would be fruitless. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
After nearly two years of counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, the insurgency shows 
no conclusive signs of going away.  While the January 2005 elections and wide 
participation by Shi’ites and Kurds was hailed as a victory by many, transnational 
criminal, jihadist, and Sunni groups have become more skilled in their tactics and 
operational art.  Iraq’s poorly guarded borders, pervasive and growing criminal threats, 
and the unifying potential of Islamic fundamentalism pose significant threats to prospects 
of peace and stability.  Defeating the Iraqi insurgency will likely be a massive 
undertaking, which will take years to accomplish.  This will be a task that will require the 
dedication of not only Iraqi, and American forces, but the support of the international 
community as well.  By now it is clear that there is no easy solution to this complex and 
multi-faceted problem, but there are things that policymakers can do in order to help.  
Recognition of the diverse nature of the Iraqi insurgency, and the challenges as well as 
the advantages that this poses to the coalition’s counterinsurgency strategy is only the 
first step in addressing Iraq’s problems.  Solving the insurgency is a process, and 
hopefully coalition and Iraqi policymakers will reorient Iraq’s counterinsurgency strategy 
toward a more flexible plan which will not only account for group differences but, 
provide Iraq with the long-term stability that it desperately needs.      
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